University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

5-1-1995

The Nikolai Spafarii calamity : the dismal failure of
Russia's first ambassadorial mission to China
(1675)
Heidi M. Stark

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
Recommended Citation
Stark, Heidi M., "The Nikolai Spafarii calamity : the dismal failure of Russia's first ambassadorial mission to China (1675)" (1995).
Theses and Dissertations. 648.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/648

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

The Nikolai Spafarii Calamity:
The Dismal Failure o f Russia’s First Ambassadorial Mission to China
(1675)

by

Heidi M. Stark
Bachelor o f History, Saginaw Valley State University, 1990

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
o f the
University o f North Dakota
in partial fulfillment o f the requirements

for the degree o f
Master o f Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota
May

1 his thesis, submitted by Heidi M. Stark in partial fulfillment if the requirements
for the Degree of Master o f Arts from the University o f North Dakota, has been read by
the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby
approved.

L
This thesis meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and format
requirements o f the Graduate School o f the University o f North Dakota, and is hereby
approved.

QjU-i.0

$

• j w

u x i P

Dean ot\Jie Graduate School

n

PERMISSION

Title

The Spafarii Calamity: The Dismal Failure o f Russia’s First
Ambassadorial Mission to China

Department

History

Degree

Master o f Arts

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for a graduate
degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the 'library o f this University shall
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis
work or, in his absence, by the Chairperson o f the department or the Dean o f the Graduate
School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use o f this thesis or part
thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also
understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University o f North
Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made o f any materia! in my thesis.

Signature

in

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER
1. The Amur Basin Dispute—Manchus and Cossacks

6

2. The First Missions

45

3. The Making o f a Diplomatic Mission

64

4. Spafarii in Action

89

5. Conclusions, Lessons and Realities

SOURCES CONSULTED

134

143

IV

IN T R O D U C T IO N

On February twenty-fifth, 1675, Russia dispatched her first official ambassador,
Nikolai Milescu Spafarii, to the distant Asian empire o f China. The Russian government
hoped to establish positive relations and develop a lucrative and immediate trade
agreement with this distant power by creating a monopoly on Chinese goods traded in
Europe. ^ To assist in achieving this objective, the Russian foreign office provided Spafarii
with an extensive entourage, lavish gifts to present to the Emperor, and a set o f
instructions that seemed to anticipate every contingency.
Lulled by the preparation and confidence o f Russia’s leadership and his own
preconceived ideas o f Chinese culture and sophistication, Spafarii believed that his mission
would be rapidly and successfully concluded. He envisioned himself triumphantly
returning to Moscow, extremely rich from Chinese gifts and trade, and presented with a
lucrative appointment from the Tsar as a reward for his exceptional and loyal service.2

* Basil Dmytryshyn, E. A. P. Crownha. -Vaughan, and Thomas Vaughan, Russia’s Conquest o f Siberia,
1558-1700: A Documentary Record, vol. 1. To Siberia and Russian America (Portland: Oregon Historical
Press, 1985), lx.
2 This was a common reward for loyal servants. Spafarii was eventually rewarded by Peter The Great
nearly fifteen years after his mission. The political upheaval created by A lexis’s death coupled with
complaints o f Spafarii’s behavior in China brought by Spafarii’s men, resulted in Spafarii’s disgrace.
Peter revived the translator’s career and in 1683 rewarded him with “one silver kovsh (dipper)” and “two
grivens weight and ten arshins of lundish {London} cloth and damask kuthteriu.” John Baddeley,
Russia. Mongolia. China (London, MacMillian and Co., 1919; Reprint, 1964), 207.
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But Spafarii’s assignment to China was more difficult than it appeared. Several other
Russian envoys and messengers had been sent to the Chinese empire during the previous
century. None had managed to engage the Emperor in a political discussion or establish
any lasting relationship between the two nations. In fact, only one, a lowly messenger—
Setkul Ablin—managed to depart China and maintain friendly relations with the Chinese
government. 3
Although the failure o f Russia’s early contacts can be attributed to diverse causes, it
is generally accepted that the primary obstacles were created by inter-cultural differences
between the two empires. Russian traditions maintain that the Tsar received his authority
to rule directly from God. This close link with the divine ensured the Tsar a regal position
in the world’s hierarchy and instilled the belief that he owed obedience to no other earthly
power. 4 China, in contrast, could not conceive o f the concept o f divine authority. Her
Emperor was not simply appointed by God, but was himself an omnipotent being. As the
ruler o f the middle kingdom—the center o f the civilized world—all earth’o ound men owed
him veneration and tribute. ^ The natural incompatibility o f these two distinct cultures
assured that conflict was inevitable and that Spafarii’s assignment would be extremely
challenging. Additionally, more mundane problems caused by miscommunication, the
language barrier, and strict guidelines for negotiation would further hamper his ability to
successfully conclude his assignment. However, none o f these obstacles can fully explain

3 See Chapter 2, pg. 48.
4 Basil Dmytryshin, A History of Russia (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), 206.
^ Owen Lattimore, Mongols ^ Manchuria (New York: H. Fcrtig, 1969), 15-16, 54-58.

3

the reasons for the mission’s dismal defeat. Only one factor, Spafarii himself, bears the
ultimate responsibility for the failure of the first ambassadorial mission to China.
Spafarii’s attitude toward the Chinese was arrogant. His position was hard and
unyielding. He was argumentative, disrespectful, and insensitive toward Chinese customs.
The natural result was an explosive and resounding repudiation, which resulted in
Spafarii’s expulsion from Peking and the severance o f all Russo-Chinese communications.
Further, the Chinese emperor used Spafarii for the next fifty years as an example o f poor
diplomacy and improper behavior. Spafarii’s inability to recognize a potentially disastrous
confrontation and alter his negotiating approach to compensate for inter-cultural
differences infuriated the Chinese and created distrust between the officials o f both
countries. T hus, it is Spafarii as an individual, his mannerisms and depoitment, that
aggravated the diplomatic situation to such a level that failure was inevitable.
As the leader o f a mission that failed to accomplish its objectives, Spafarii would
have significant impact on the future relationship between Russia and China. Although
Russia would not immediately achieve her goal o f a trade relationship, Spafarii did
manage during the course of his protracted stay in Peking to establish extensive contacts
with Chinese officials and developed a tentative relationship with the Chinese emperor.
Through these contacts, Spafarii’s mission cleariy illustrated the communication problem
that lay at the heart - ‘'th e ongoing Russian-Chinese conflict. Thus his mission, although a
failure in the short term, was a necessary part of the diplomatic process. Only such a
spectacular failure could demonstrate to both sides their incompatible political ideals.

4

Traditionally, examinations of Spafarii’s mission to China have centered on the
problems caused by cultural differences or the personality conflict between Spafarii and
the primary Chinese negotiator, Mala.^ Little or no blame for the mission’s failure has
ever been attached to Spafarii for his actions in China. Nor have any speculations been
made regarding the lasting impact o f this poorly mannered Russian ambassador on the
future o f Russo-Chinese relations beyond the successful negotiation o f the Treaty o f

^ A large number of Siberian documents and records have been lost through the years by fire, careless
keeping or simple destruction and deterioration. Thanks to G. F. Muller, a German historian who
traveled extensively throughout Siberia for ten years ( 1733-1743) many documents have been preserved
that would have otherwise been lost. Out of the many document collections in both the St. Petersburg and
Moscow libraries, two well researched works chronicle Spafarii’s mission: Muller’s six volume Siberian
History published in 1732-1764 and a two volume Siberian History published by his protdge J. E. Fischer
(1768). Unfortunately, Muller’s work has disappeared. Baddelev’s Russia. Mongolia, China is the last
known work to have utilized Muller’s work as a reference source and a number o f the documents
contained in its pages arc extrapolated from the six volume history. Finally, Spafarii’s own record,
“Statenii spisok posolstva N. Spafariia v Kitai,” in Vestnik Arkheoloeii I Istorii. provides a personal
accounting o f the embassy.
There are very few modem works analyzing Spafarii’s mission. Perhaps the best known is Mark
M ancall’s excellent book, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, Other source material
providing interesting or contradictory views arc Vincent Chin, Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth
Century. V. S. Missnikov, The Ch’ing Empire and the Russian State in the Seventeenth Century
Translated by Vic Schneiersin, and Liu Hsuan-min’s excellent article, “Russo-Chinese Relations up to the
Treaty o f Nerchinsk,” from the Chinese Social and Political Science Review.
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Nerchinsk (1689). Through examination o f the events o f this ill-fated mission, as related
by the words and feelings o f Spafarii, this paper will pursue the emotional conflict created
by the Russian ambassador’s attitude and actions during his mission in China. The results
o f this emotional aspect, both in its immediate impact on the Treaty o f Nerchinsk and the
indelible impression which strongly influenced China’s perception o f Russian diplomacy,
requires further examination and should be considered in the analysis o f early RussianChinese relations.

CHAPTER 1: THE AMUR RASIN DISPUTE-M ANCHUS AND COSSACKS

From 1643 to 1675, Russia and China had been engaged in an armed conflict over
the control of the rich resources o f the Amur basin and competed for the suzerainty o f its
peoples. For more than thirty years, Russian Cossacks had continuously ravaged the
region, demanding furs and foodstuffs from the defenseless natives and killing
indiscriminately when the required goods were withheld. The Chinese government, bound
by their ties o f kinship and tribute, was compelled to assist the natives. But despite several
large scale military operations in the region, the Chinese were incapable o f ridding the land
o f the Russian invaders.
By 1670, China was no longer able to muster the troops needed to control the
Amur basin. The young Ch’ing dynasty required every able-bodied man to suppress the
Ming dissenters in the southern reaches o f China. Unable to maintain military protection
for the Amur, China was willing to negotiate with the Russians to peaceably split the
Amur basin. She realized that without military support, she was helpless to protect the
Amur natives and the territory would be gradually torn away by the Russians. ^ Unwilling

7 V. S. Miasnikov, The Ch’inr Empire and the Russian State in the Seventeenth Century, translated by
Vic Schneiersin (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), 405.
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to completely relinquish her claims in the Amur basin and allow Russia full control over
the northern Manchu tribes, China preferred the option of negotiating a treaty.
China maintained a strong negotiating position. The Amur basin, through adjacent
borders and historical ownership, technically belonged to her. She claimed the Amur
through ancient ties, asserting the Amur natives were members o f the wild lurcher, tribes,
kin to the Manchu and relr' ^d by blood. The Amur tribes also paid China tribute and had
freely chosen to accept the leadership o f the Manchu. The fact that China was incapable
o f protecting the region from intruders was an irrelevant factor. The support o f the
natives’ allegiance and their common ancestry was deemed sufficient by the Manchu to
substantiate their claim.
Yet China’s strongest argument for her continued control over the Amur was the
basin’s location. With Peking located just twelve hundred kilometers due south o f tne
basin, the close physical contact encouraged interaction. Unfortunately for the Chinese,
the Khingan mountain range provided an inconvenient barrier. It hindered travel and
communication and limited Peking’s ability to maintain a close relationship. This range
was small, however, with peaks rising just two hundred to three hundred meters above the
surrounding territory. In comparison to the mighty barriers the Russians faced, the
Khingan range was only a minor inconvenience.
Two great ranges, the Stanovoi range in the north and the Yablonovii to the west,
effectively impeded Russian access to the Amur basin. Only one major river provided
reasonable access to the Amur’s interior. The Olekma, a tributary o f the mighty Lena,

8

formed its headwaters on the east side o f the Yablonovii range and offered a difficult but
usable ingress for Russian explorers.** However, this mountainous barrier was only the end
o f a long and tedious journey for the Russians. Because the Amur was located in the
extreme Southeastern corner o f the Russian empire, supplies, troops and messages had to
travel more than five thousand kilometers from Moscow over a wild and untamed steppe
and marshland before reaching the forested foothills o f the Yablonovii range.
Once inside the Amur’s protective ring o f mountains, one massive river system
provided easy access throughout the region. The Amur, a river which winds more than
fifteen hundred miles from the Pacific ocean into the interior, is augmented by four major
tributaries. The Shilka and Argun, the Amur’s source rivers, provide access deep into the
mountainous western terrain. To the east, the lesser tributaries, the Sungari and Ussuri,
provide watery highways south into Chinese territory. These five waterways, the Amur
and her four tributaries, provided Russian access to the entire Amur Basin—an area
measuring more than 1,230,000 square kilometers.^
At first glance it is obvious why both Russia and China prized the Amur in the
mid-seventeenth century. This massive enclosed basin was a haven o f diversity and wealth.
The entire area was characterized by exceptionally rich soil, temperate climate and
abundant wildlife Average temperatures, even in the upper region, ranged between
sixteen and nineteen degrees Celsius. The resulting growing season, while short and cool,

8 Mclvyri G. Howe, The Soviet Union: A Gcoeranhical Study (Plymouth: MacDonald and Evans, 1983),
379.
9 Ibid., 396.
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was surprisingly productive and produced an amazing array o f grains and vegetables.
Numerous grains—including rye, spring wheat, oats, and barley--were cultivated by the
local tribesmen. Cabbage and potatoes also grew exceptionally well in the rich Amur soil.
At the higher elevations, pastoral activities were favored. Cattle arid hearty stout-legged
hordes roamed the flat mountain piains in abundance. Even the river itself was rich in
whitefish and sturgeon, while its delta, which opens on the Pacific Ocean, provided an
ideal launch for seafaring boats. ^
For the Russians, the Amur’s most prized aspect was its bountiful wildlife. An
array o f fur-bearing animals, including the cherished sable, ennine, and several species o f
fox, (especially red and black Arctic), thrived and multiplied freely in the thick Amur
forests. The exceptional quality o f Amur furs, thick and lush due to the cooler
temperatures and rich diet, brought premium prices during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries and were highly valued by the Russian trappers who flooded the region searching
for pelts. * 1
The Manchu, on the other hand, were not interested in exploiting the materia!
wealth o f the Amur. They were more concerned with the native population. To the
Manchu, the people o f the Amur represented part o f an ancient link with the cherished
Chin dynasty (1115-1234). The Jurchen, from whom the Manchu descended, fostered the
Chin dynasty and ruled the entire Manchurian-Amur region-an area stretching from

10 Ibid., 406-07.
11 Ibid., 405.
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northern Siberia, south through modern Irkutsk to the southern tip o f Manchuria and
westward into the high mountain plateaus. However, despite defeating the Khitans^ and
severely threatening the existence o f the South Sung Dynasty (1127-1271?) o f Southern
China, the Jurchen were doomed. The continuous threat o f the Mongol hordes was
impossible to combat.13
In 1234, the powerful Chin dynasty fell, dissolving the cohesive bond

yeloped by

the Jurchen tribes. As the population scattered, the Jurchen divided into four
geographically separate and distinct tribes. The Mao-Lien moved south o f the Ch’ang-Pai
river. Just to their north and extending to the Yalu river lived the Chien-Chou—the tribe
that evolved into the Manchu, the future rulers o f China. The Hai-Hsi inhabited the areas
near the Sungari and Arshih rivers, while in the land surrounding the Amur and the Ussuri,
the Wild Jurchen lived. ^

The Manchu believed that the Amur tribes were, in reality, the

wild Jurchen tribes, isolated in the Amur basin and largely forgotten for four hundred
years.
There is a grain o f truth in the Manchu belief. During the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, members o f the Jurchen tribes interacted with the existing Amur natives, mixing
with the nati ve stock and altering the natives’ time-honored customs and way o f life.*13

The Khitans were a tribe of Asian nomadic people that created the Liao empire in the tenth century. It
is commonly assumed that they were absorbed into the Mongol nation between the twelfth and fourteenth
centuries. Denis Twitchett and John K Fairbanks, cds., Mina Dynasty 1368-1644. vol. 7, pt. 1,
Cambridge History of China. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 397.
13 M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov, Peonies of Siberia. (London: University, o f Chicago Press, 1964), 97.

U Twitchett, 266.
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Unfortunately, while their influence is clear throughout the basin, nowhere in the Amur
does clear evidence exist confirming the arrival and settlement o f the Wild Jurchen
tribes. *5
A reasonable hypothesis suggests internal dissension combined with the continuous
plague o f Mongols in the region completely eliminated Jurchen autonomy and dissolved
their tribal authority. The displaced tribal members were then absorbed into the
independent Amur tribes. The Nanays o f the Ussuri River, for example, seem to have
retained much o f the Wild Jurchen culture though, even here it is distorted by the ancient
Amur culture o f the Niviki. While the evidence indicates the Amur natives are not direct
descendants of the Wild Jurchen, the diversity o f the Amur tribes, in language and culture
confirms a separate heritage comprised o f Jurchen elements as well as Chinese, Mongol,
and Turkish. *6
For four hundred years following the disintegration o f the Chin dynasty, the Amur
tribes were left in strict isolation. Not until 1616 was their solitude broken. Members o f
the strong Manchu clan penetrated the Amur searching for remnants o f the Wild Jurchen
tribes. They sought allies and support among their cld relations in their bid against the
faltering Ming dynasty. Tribes throughout the lower and central Amur were contacted 16

^ Levin, 692.
16 Ibid., 696.
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and willingly offered their allegiance to the growing strength o f the Manchu. By 1636, the
upper Amur tribes also supported their distant relatio n s.^
The natives’ decision to join the Manchu was not due to oppression, but was
rather a decision to enhance their security and well-being. Unlike the traditional idea o f
tribute, The Manchu’s concept had few drawbacks. They pledged support and assistance
to the natives and asked only that other invaders be made unwelcome. The standard notion
that tribute involved subservience and subjugation was repugnant to the Manchu. They
believed that tribute should be the confirmation o f a contract between two willing and
equal partners. Offerings presented by the weaker member implied that a gift o f equal or
greater value must be given in exchange. This harmonious approach made the Amur
natives willing to accept the Manchu’s leadership.
Suzerainty to the Manchu did not alter life in the Amur. With the exception o f
occasional trade caravans and Manchu officials sent to observe the continued security o f
the basin, the natives continued their daily routines. Even the Manchus’ bid for the Ming
throne failed to disturb the peaceful quiet of the region. The silence and isolation o f the
Amur remained intact despite the major alteration o f China’s ruling authority. This
peaceful isolation was shattered by the invasion o f Russian explorers in the mid sixteenhundreds, who demanded tribute and challenged China’s authority over the region.

U Information on the Manchu challenge to the Ming dynasty by Nurhaci can be located in Twitchctt,
574-82 and Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China. American Geographical Society Research
Series, (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940), 127-33. Regarding Abahai, Nurhaci’s son,
and the conquest of the Chinese throne. Twitchctt. 616-18; 628-29.
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Before this fateful confrontation in the Amur, Russia and China knew very little
concrete information about each other’s existence. They had encountered each other only
twice in the centuries preceding the sixteen-hundreds. These early contacts, while
relatively insignificant to sixteenth-century politics, indicated awareness by both parties of
the other’s existence. ^

A few brief notes in the Chinese record indicates that, a Russian

Grand Duke, Yaroslav, visited the City o f Karakorune in 1246 to attend the coronation o f
the Grand Khan Kuyak. ^
The second event occurred nearly a century later, in 1329-32. The Chinese record
recorded that a group o f Russian prisoners were being held just north o f Peking by the
Yuan Emperor, Wen-Tsung. These prisoners weie settled on Chinese land, and were given
clothing, oxen, tools and seed. 20 Whether they were imprisoned or remained o f their own
free will is unknown. The Chinese record does indicate that they were a curiosity and
primarily provided game and fish for the Emperor’s tabled 1*21

During this period, both Russia and China were controlled by Mongols. Batu Khan, predecessor o f
Kublai, (d. 1294) established the Sung dynasty (960-1279) in China. Tien-fang Cheng, A History o f SinoRussian Relations, with an introduction by John Licghton Stuart (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1957), 5-6.
Yaroslav apparently did not make the long journey in an official capacity but purely for social and
curiosity reasons. It is likely that Yaroslav would have completely escaped the notice o f the Chinese, but
he died during his visit. Mark Mancall, Russia arid China; Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 36. Baddclely, xxxiv.
29 Harry Schwartz, Tsars. Mandarins, and Commissars: a History of Chincse-Russian Relations
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), 24. There are also scattered reports o f Russians employed among
Peking’s imperial guards. Cheng, 10.
21 Vincent Chin, Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nighoff, 1966), 34. During this period, China knew little of the lands outside her own domain and h3d no
desire to explore and understand neighboring countries. Without knowledge of the Russian people, it was
extremely difficult for reclusive China to distinguish between the various peoples outside her borders.
Every early reference to Russia in the Chinese record is a vague account of a distant people. The Chinese
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Unsurprisingly, both of these instances are unconfirmed by Russian sources. Early
Russian records are notoriously unreliable and incomplete, and little evidence o f
diplomatic contacts remains from these early periods. An excellent example o f the
unreliability of early Russian documents is the first Russian-recorded visit to Ch.na. The
Russian archives contain a document that was reportedly filed in 1567. The chronicle,
entitled “Descriptions o f Countries Beyond Siberia”, describes the conquest o f Siberia
and the status o f the large country to the east known as China. The expedition, lead by
two men, Pertrov and Alishev, reportedly visited China and traveled extensively through
the eastern region.22
Historians, however, seriously doubt that this mission ever took place. First, the
normally meticulous Chinese records failed to report the visit o f a foreign entourage in
1567 and, in fact, did not mention any Russian visit during the 1500’s.23

Secondly, the

document’s information seems improbable for this time period, in the 1560’s, the Siberian
conquest had not yet begun and the segments regarding China seem to parallel events o f
seventeenth-century China, not sixteenth-century.24 Vincent Chin, a Chinese political
historian, speculates that this mission was misdocumented by Russian chroniclers in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He feels that the document is a misplaced copy o f 24

never indicated any working knowledge of Russia’s location nor have written any suggestive clues of
culture and behavior that may assist in actually confirming the nationality o f these two encounters. In all
likelihood China attached little significance to these early encounters and were untroubled as to the
nationality of these insignificant peoples.
Samual Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom, vol. 2 (New York: Paragon, 1966), 441.
22 “Journey of Petlin and Mundoff, 1618-1619,” in Baddeley, 69.
24 Chin, 35.
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the Petlin mission report from 1618. Chin explains that the document is nearly verbatim to
the official report filed by Petlin upon his return to Moscow. Additionally, the data
gleaned from the 1567 report is consistent with the early quarter o f the seventeenth
century. Chin’s theory is strengthened by the realization that an individual named Pertrov
was a member o f a 1616 mission to Mongolia.25
The inaccuracy in Russian records is understandable. The fifteenth century was
extremely hectic and unsettling for the entire Russian population. Under the rule o f Ivan
Groznyi (commonly referred to as Ivan the Terrible), Russia endured sweeping political
and ecclesiastical reforms and fought an ambitious military campaign against the southern
Khanates. As Russia rapidly grew in power and importance, she also was included in the
political affairs of Europe and began negotiating trade agreements with the more powerful
nations. Amid this turbulent time period, ensuring the accuracy o f historical documents
was given only minor importance. Economics became the primary concern.
Victory over the Khanates required large amounts o f capital, weapons and
manpower. Relations with Europe demanded large amounts o f monetary support for
envoys and messengers and their traveling expenses. Initiating trade also required large
amounts o f ready assets. Russia was, however, desperately short o f currency. The war
had nearly emptied her coffers, and her traditional economic system was based primarily25

25 Ibid.
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on barter or trade-in-kind. The European nations demanded hard currency which was
simply not available.26
Unlike other European nations, Russia lacked natural sources o f silver, gold, and
other valuable ore metals and precious stones. Although Russia did have a reasonable
amount o f copper available for coinage, copper was relatively cheap and the rubles Russia
produced were worthless outside the country without the support o f precious metals. To
compound this lack of hard currency, Russia vvas hampereH by circumstance. A cool
climate, short growing season, and long distances to European markets made trading
agricultural produce impossible. Without a strong agricultural base, Russia was unable to
develop cottage industries to produce trade goods for export. Instead, Russia’s European
trade consisted o f Asian and Middle Eastern goods that were transported over Russian
soil. But even these valuable goods failed to generate hard currency. Asian merchants
demanded precious metals in exchange for spices and silks and European traders refused
to pay gold or silver for these goods—they preferred to trade-in-kind. The result was a
vicious economic circle that ensured Russia was indigent.27
During the mid fifteen hundreds, Russia discovered an item that solved this
economic difficulty—fur. Animal pelts were the one item Russia had in abundance.
Throughout. Russia a vast profusion o f wild and wooded lands provided safe haven for
numerous species o f fur bearing mammals. Russia’s cold, bitter weather, considered a*2

26 Mancall, 11-12.
22 Hsuan-min, 392.
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detriment to agricultural growth, proved to be a blessing. It encouraged the growth o f
thick lush pelts unrivaled in quality anywhere in the world. The result o f these two factors
provided Russia a natural monopoly o f thick, high-quality animal pelts. Europe became
ecstatic over Russia’s new export. The wealthy elite clamored for the precious and rare
furs and willingly accepted them in lieu o f gold and silver. Russian diplomats began to
arrive routinely in Europe’s great cities carrying bales o f fine pelts. These furs were
carefully doled out as payment for food, lodging and other travel expenditures incurred by
their entourage. Sable and mink were offered as diplomatic “gifts” and used as payment
for political favors and subsidies.28
Russia’s increasing interest in European affairs during the late sixteenth century,
combined with rapidly multiplying European trade, dramatically increased Russia’s fur
requirements. From a modest 3.75 % of the state’s economic income in 1589, fur
skyrocketed to an impressive 11 percent over a fifteen-year period. Ama/.ingly, this figure
remained steady for the next forty years, only dropping slightly to 10 percjnt in 1644.29
Efforts to satisfy this huge governmental requirement rapidly depleted the areas
surrounding the Volga and the Don rivers, forcing hunters to range great distances to
locate the precious pelts.29

2^ Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade 1550-1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1943), 100.

29 Ibid., 102.
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East was the natural direction for Russian expansion and exploration. In all other
directions, strong powers—Turkey to the south, Poland and Lithuania to the west and
Sweden to the frigid north—possessively defended their borders from Russian
encroachment. Only to the east was open land available. Although once controlled by the
Mongol hordes, the steppe to the east o f Russia had lain empty since the disintegration o f
their empire in 1480 and awaited an infusion o f new people to settle and control the vast
region. Eagerly, Russians began investigating the vast flat steppe, assisted by the land’s
natural topography. The area was interlaced with a profusion o f river systems that made
eastern travel quick and relatively simple. In under fifty years, the Russian exploring
parties had spread across the steppe and began entering the treacherous Yablonovii
mountain range o f S ib eria.^
Russian merchants, led by Anika Stroganov in 1558, headed the eastern fur charge.
The promise o f bountiful furs and new trade opportunities enticed many merchants to fund
large exploration parties. These efforts were encouraged by significant government
incentives which included long-term relief from heavy government taxes and unconditional
military and government assistance. These factors, when combined with the possibility o f
huge profits from fur sales, encouraged hundreds o f merchants to travel into the eastern
wilderness.^ 1 By 1586 they had crossed the Ural mountain range and established many*3

^D m ytryshin, Russia’s Conquest o f Siberia, xl.
3 * Normally, Russian exploration parties operated on a three step plan. First, they followed river systems
deep into the wilderness, searching for game and evidence of fur-bearing predators. When a promising
area was located, a strategic fort called an “ostrog” was constructed to act as a secure base o f operations.
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forts, including Tiumen (1586), Surgut and Tara in 1594, and Tomsk in 1604. Relentless
exploring resulted in expeditions eastward from these newly established forts in the
mountains to the south and to the extreme far east. By 1619, the Russians reached the
Enisei river system and founded the plains fort of Eniseisk. llimsk and Krasnoiarsk, two
settlements in the Buryat territories to the west o f lake Baikal, became brisk exchange
points o f fur for gold and silver in the late 1620’s. The last great northern flowing river
system, the Lena, received it first settlement, Irkutsk, in 1632.32
During this tremendous effort, Russia never forgot China, the legendary land to the
far southeast. While trade and exploration continued on the plains, Russia continuously
sent small dispatches further east to discover China’s exact location. Few o f these
missions provided concrete information. The most credible account is from a 1608
mission dispatched by the Tomsk Voevoda, Vasili Vasilievich Volinski.33 Initially, this
mission was instructed to travel southward through the territory o f the Atlin Khan in the
guise of a trading caravan, but they aborted their mission when the Kalrnuks revolted
against the Atlin Khan. Threatened by ambush and open hostility, the expedition hastily32

Local natives, were then contacted and compelled to assist the Russian’s efforts. The natives were forced
to provide an exorbitant number of furs in tribute and tithes to the Russian tsar. Finally, Russian hunters
and trappers radiated outward from the ostrog in all directions subjugating natives and securing as many
furs as they could carry for tanning and transport back to Moscow. George Vjatchcslau Lantzeff, Siberia
in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Octagon Books, 1972) 87-90.
32 Dmytryshin, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia, xl.
Voevoda was the local authority on the Russian frontier. He was entnisted to regulate the gathering
o f tribute and ensure that it was receive in Moscow in a timely manner. In addition he was the dispenser
o f local justice and acted as the Tsar’s administrator.
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retreated back to Russian territory. Upon their return they filed a report explaining all
they had heard about the lands tc the south.34
And to the Chinese kingdom, it is three month’s journey from the Atlin
Tsar, and the Chinese Kingdom has a stone-built town and courtyards in
that town, like the Russians; in those courtyards there are stone-built halls
and he (evidently the Chinese Emperor) is stronger in people than the Atlin
Tsar, and richer. And in his court there are stone-built halls. And in that
town there are temples, and in them a great ringing o f bells. There are no
crosses in the temples, and what religion they have is unknown, but they
live like the Russians. They use fire-arms, and people come from many
lands to trade with them, and they wear golden robes, and to him they
bring all kinds o f precious stones and other things out o f many countries.-^

This wealth o f information was enough to fund an official delegation to China to
encourage relations. In 1618, the Russian government sent Ivan Shko Petlin and
Ondruchka Mundov into Chinese territory. Although the pair and their entourage safely
arrived in China, they were unaware o f proper Chinese protocol.

Peltin had not brought

gifts to the Khan, and lacking them was refused an audience with the Emperor. The
Chinese officials did welcome the visiting group warmly and encouraged them to return
with proper gifts.36 Before Petlin returned to Russian territory he was given an official
document from the Khan that expressed China’s eagerness to establish trade.
The letter read as follows:

Van Li (Wan-li}Chinese Tsar, two men arrived out o f Russia and Van Li,
Chinese Tsar said to those Russian people, come to trade, then go away*3

34 "The Petition of Prince Toyan, the Eyushta Chieftain,” in Baddcley, 34-35.
3- Ibid.
“The Statenii Spisok,” in Baddelcy, 82. Mancall, 43.
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and come again. In the whole Wwrld, thou, a great lord and I, am not a
small one; let the road between us be clear up and down to go by and do
you {Russians} bring the best you have and in return I will make you
presents o f good silk-stuff, and you will journey back, and if you come
again, and with you people from the great Lord, bringing a letter from him,
I will send him a letter in return. And then letters come from you, I will
order that they will he received with greatest honour and the people with
them; but I cannot end an ambassador to you. Great Lord, for the way is
long and they know not the language; but I now address my homage to
you. Great Lord, and beg him to believe that, were it possible I would send
my ambassadors but by my custom, 0 Tsar, I neither leave my own
kingdom nor allow my ambassadors or merchants to do so.37

This letter clearly indicates the willingness o f the Chinese to establish trade
relations with the Russians but denotes that Russian traders must travel to China. Beyond
this implicit message the letter explains little of the time period and serves only as a
reference point to establish the Russians’ interest in trading relations with China.
AJthough this letter’s authenticity is highly debated by Chinese Scholars,38 the fact that
the Russians felt that it was genuine is significant. For more than sixty years, the Russian
government held and examined this letter, formulating political policy and ultimately
seeking to capture the lucrative trade mentioned in the document. This document could
very easily have been the single factor that prompted the Russians to seek friendship with
the Chinese.38

•^Chin, 37 . Van-Li (Wan-Li is also known by his reign title Shcn-tsung and his personal name Chu IChun.
38 The authenticity argument stems from the fact that the letter was not recorded in the meticulous
Chinese records. Any written response to a foreign countiy should have been significant enough to be
included in the official records. Ibid.
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The Russians, having discovered that the Ming dynasty favored peaceful trade,
declined to cement the relationship with further diplomatic missions. They were
exceptionally wary of the Chinese’s openly friendly manner and completely suspended
their attempts to trade and communicate. They reasoned that the immense distance to
China was too far for merchants to trade profitably and there were other dangerous
considerations as well. The currently used route through the territory o f the Atlin Khan
was lined with hostile and warlike natives, and other tribes like the Buriats, Tungus,
Kalmuks and Kirgiz harassed travelers and shipments east o f this region. Generally the
ri^k o f successfully bringing a caravan unscathed through this wilderness was immense.
To overcome this difficulty Russ'a concocted a more ambitious plan. She planned
to depend upon her friendship with the Atlin Khan and her subjugation o f the Sungars to
establish a successful three-party trac

This scheme allowed Russian nearly all o f the

henefits o f direct trade with the Asian giant but provided less risk to participating
merchants. In addition, by sending the men o f the Atlin Khan into Chinese territory,
Russia completely eliminated the opportunity for the Chinese to take action against
Russian trading parties.
Russia was able to initiate this plan in 1632, when the Atlin Khan required Russian
aid to maintain his kingdom. In exchange for Russian assistance, the Khan gratefully
agreed to the Russians proposal and granted Russian traders the right to trade and deal
freely with his own merchants for Chinese goods. By 1638, this profitable business had
grown am arkably and the Mongol traders honored Russian requests to travel to Russian
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frontier towns with their goods. Segra and Bayan were among the first settlements to be
visited and became brisk trade centers for sliver, damask, cattle and cotton. This practice
rapidly increased and became a regular occurrence. Tomsk, a major Russian trade center,
eventually became the Mongols’ final destination and their regular caravans provided a
steady and lucrative trade in Chinese goods.
In 1643, this profitable business was halted. The overthrow o f the Ming dynasty
earlier in the year resulted in turmoil and destroyed the delicate trade arrangement Russia
had established. Deprived o f the security o f her regular shipments, Russia was forced to
suspend trade operations until the political conflict in China quieted. But the ten years of
trade with the Atlin Khan had altered Russia’s outlook. Her Siberian ostrogs w'ere no
longer viewed as simple hunting or defensive stations but rather as frontier centers for
trade.40 Irkutsk was the first frontier ostrog to demonstrate this change in policy.
Established in 1632, the settlement o f Irkutsk marked a crucial turning point for
Russia—the change from a policy of exploration to one o f conscious colonization/1
Although the settlement’s primary function, like earlier ostrogs, was to provide pelts for
the Tsar’s coffers, Irkutsk was to become a true settlement from which Russia could 39*41

39Chin, 28-29.
Ostrogs consist of a walled compound containing two or more cabins or underground huts called
Zimivies. The Irkust ostrog was the largest in the region. The 1684 ostrog (rebuilt after being destroyed
by fire) had four walls measuring four thousand feet and eight watchtowers on the walls. It surrounded a
powder house, two jails (one for the heretics and one for criminals), hostage quarters, and the voevoda’s
house, Nearby, approximately five hundred feet away, stood the gorod (city), the married men’s quarter,
and other religious buildings. Frank Alfred Colder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641-1850.
(Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark Co., 1914), 26.
41 Dmytryshin, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia, xl.
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spread across the remainder of Siberia. Advantageously situated within the Verkhoyansk
mountain range, Irkutsk would perform the role o f Russia’s first administrative center in
Siberia.

The Olekma river, a tributary o f the Lena, provided easy access deep into the

mountains and encouraged hunters and trappers to expand eastward. The Lena, in
contrast, provided free movement to Irkutsk from the broad Russian steppe, greatly
simplifying the flow o f goods and people between Irkutsk and Moscow. Naturally, the
settlement was hampered by the immense cost o f shipping in supplies and the difficulty o f
communicating with the Russian capital, but these difficulties were easily overcome
through the self-reliance and ingenuity o f Irkutsk’s colonizing population.
Irkutsk was settled by three diverse yet similar groups. First, was a small
contingent o f government officials assigned to oversee the area’s development and the
annual harvest o f fur. A slightly larger group consisted o f Russian hunters and trappers
that were drawn to the wilderness for adventure, wealth, or freedom from harsh Russian
justice. The largest and most influential group was comprised o f Russian Cossacks.^2
Rugged and ruthless, the hearty lifestyle the Cossacks developed made the nation
particularly well suited to the rigors o f exploration and extremely valuable as a naturally42

42 The Cossacks, although primarily o f Russian heritage, had developed a unique culture. Formed from
social misfits; rebellious peasants, hardened criminals, deserting soldiers and even adventurous third and
fourth sons o f boyars; the Cossacks became a fierce nation of hardy, callused warriors and skilled hunters.
They were hardened by the difficulties of steppe life and tempered by individual trials o f determination
and bravery. They survived the difficult steppe by raiding unsuspecting trade caravans and villages for
women, iron goods, and tools, which instilled in the Cossack mentality the right o f plunder. Yet within
the Cossack society, equality was the primary factor. Every man held voting rights, the right to speak and
to act in any fashion (as long as his actions did not infringe upon the rights o f other Cossacks). John
Foreman, Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway by Vladimer (pseud.) (London: S. Low, Marston
and Company, limited, 1899), 47-50.
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trained fighting force. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the Russian Government
reached an uneasy truce with these roving bands of warriors. They agreed to allow the
Cossacks full autonomy in all tribal matters in exchange for rejoining the Russian empire
as armed warriors and protectors of the throne. But utilizing these wild, rugged men was
extremely difficult. Russian Cossacks could not be bound by Russian law and practiced
their marauding lifestyle without restraint on both newly dis< tvered natives ar;d
established Russian subjects.43
Irkutsk, like every frontier settlement, faced the same difficulties controlling the
wild and dangerous Cossacks. Months from Moscow lav/s and retribution, Russian
officials lacked the authority and the brute force required to restrain the lawless men. By
their nature, the independent Cossacks categorically refused to be bound by laws and
seldom accepted orders. Their resistance to the authorities prompted Russian hunters to
also ignore traditional laws. As a result, a combination o f Cossack lifestyle and group
survival dictated local law and justice. The Voevoda, by authority from Moscow,
presided as the sole administrator and decided both the verdict and the sentence to be
administered. Normally penalties were lenient primarily due to the voevoda’s personal
interest in maintaining pelt quotas. Men killed or seriously wounded decreased the
profitability o f Irkutsk and decreased the voevoda’s income. Flogging or minor mutilations
were the most common punishments, although occasionally capital punishment was 43

43Ibid.
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required. Murder was commonplace in wild Siberia, but even the horrendous crime o f
killing a superior officer seldom resulted in capital punishment. Instead, these violent
offenders petitioned the Voevoda for hazardous duty—generally exploring unknown
wilderness areas and subduing resisting natives. Since this duty enhanced the productivity
o f the ostrog, petitions o f this nature were normally granted 4445
Tribute gathering was particularly well suited to these violent men. By the Tsar’s
order, any means necessary was authorized to ensure the natives accepted Russian
suzerainty, including death. Every few years a tribute train departed Irkutsk. It consisted
o f a large armed party and a Prikazchik, a petty official appointed as acting Voevoda.
This group would travel throughout the territory requesting tribute from the local natives.
Consenting natives immediately surrendered hostages to the Cossacks and produced the
required tribute. However, occasionally a native tribe would refuse. In these instances,
the Cossacks would immediately attack without another word, never offering the natives a
chance to reconsider. The offending natives were slaughtered to the last man, the village
razed and all women and children captured and divided among the marauding Cossacks as
plunder.4 ^
By 1637, Irkutsk was well established. The ostrog was well supplied and fully
operational. The local natives were subdued and a steady stream o f fur shipments was
dispatched to Moscow. The immense wealth of the area had enriched every inhabitant and

44 Goldcr, 23.
45 Ibid., 27
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gained Irkutsk an unparalleled reputation. Hundreds of Russians flooded toward the
settlement seeking to make their fortune. Hunters, trappers, craftsmen, and a multitude of
women and childien arrived in pursuit o f their dreams, rapidly expanding Irkutsk’s
population. In a few short months, the influx o f people reached and then overwhelmed the
area’s natural capacity. The surrounding area rapidly became depleted o f game and plant
life. Food supplies became dangerously short and starvation threatened the existence o f
the Russian s e ttle rs .D e s p e ra te ly , the Irkutsk Voevoda searched for a feasible solution.
An Irkutsk resident detected a promising solution. He had discovered three upper
branches o f the Lena river, the Aldan, the Ucher and the Ludoma, in 1636. The wildlife
located on these three rivers could provide only temporary relief to starving Irkutsk, but
natives and traders who explored the area learned o f a promising water system further
South across the Savoy mountains. That system could possibly provide supplies for
Irkutsk. It was rumored that in this distant land, cattle and horses roamed in large herds.
Grain grew in large fields on the banks o f the river. Ermine, fox, sable and other rich fur
bearing animals prospered in staggering numbers. The natives, called the Dahurs, were a
quiet, peaceful people that welcomed traders and hunters that passed through their lands.
The area was even rumored to be located close to China and participated in active trade
with ihe Asian giant in silks, silver, gold and pearls.*47

4^Liu Hsuan-min, “Russo-Chinesc Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk,” Chinese Social and
Political Science Review 23 (1939-1940), 393.
47Goldcr, 32.
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The minors grew gradually in the telling until even the Voevodas o f Irkutsk, Petr
Golovin and Matvei Glebov, could not ignore the possibility o f the river basin’s existence.
In 1641, they authorized a full investigation into the rumors. Three separate expeditions
were dispatched. Each was instructed to either confirm or deny the reports o f silver,
cattle and furs in the river basin across the mountains. The first, Perofiyev (1641) located
a traveling band o f Tungus hunters that had traveled through the region and along the
Shilka river. His questioning revealed that the natives owned silver and blue painted
articles that were probably acquired from China. Unfortunately, Perofiyev returned to
Irkutsk without personally confirming this information. Moskvitin (1642) was also able to
confirm the Shilka’s existence. Tungus traders, traveling from the Shilka, confirmed the
existence o f plentiful grain and silver to be gained from the region, and indicated they had
personally witnessed the bounty of the area. Moskvitin, too, could not personally
substantiate the facts he reported. The onset of harsh winter turned him back while he
was attempting to cross the high mountains. The third expedition was led by
Bachteyarov in 1643. Fully equipped for a laborious mountain crossing and assisted by a
native guide, Bachteyarov and his men set forth for the Shilka. Unfortunately,
Bachteyarov was completely incompetent and jeopardized both the expedition and his men
with his faulty decisions. His mission returned to Irkutsk a complete failure.48

48 Ibid., 34.
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Golovin and Glebov were heartened by these inconclusive yet encouraging reports
and decided a major expedition was required to decide the issue, but they were replaced
by Vasilii Pushkin and Kiril Suponev before they could send another expedition. The two
new voevodas, however, decided to follow their predecessor’s plans. Late in 1643, a large
expedition was organized to claim the area for the Russian throne. This force consisted o f
133 men, including 112 Cossacks, fully armed and provisioned for an extensive journey.
Pushkin even authorized the expedition to take several canon to ensure the expedition’s
success. Vasili Poyarkov, the expedition’s leader, was given explicit instructions to
proceed carefully and gather small amounts o f tribute from the area’s natives as a sampling
o f the region’s bounty. In addition, Poyarkov was to discover if China maintained a
presence in the area and determine if the basin was attached to the Chinese empire. 49
Unfortunately, Poyarkov was uninterested in diplomacy. He viewed the expedition to the
Shilka river as the means to develop his personal fortune rather than the opportunity to
provide a favorable first perception of the Russian empire.
Poyarkov’s journey east was extremely difficult. Hampered by the heavy canon
and cumbersome supplies, he became caught in the severe Siberian winter. The rugged
Savoy mountain passes separated his forces and forced Poyarkov to abandon the majority
o f his supplies to descend to safety. Nearly frozen and half starved, Poyarkov decided to
set up camp in mid-December. Deep snow prevented foraging and it soon became

49 George Vjatchcslau Lantzeff, Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open
Frontier to 1750 (Montreal: MeGill-Qneen’s University Press, 1973), 155-56.
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apparent that the expedition would starve long before spring without assistance.
Poyarkov, in desperation, approached the nearby Daur natives and requested sustenance.
The natives charitably welcomed Poyarkov and his men and offered part o f their own
winter cache to assist the visiting Russians through the hard winter. Poyarkov returned to
the Daur regularly, requesting and finally demanding additional supplies from the natives
to support the expedition. Finally, the Daurs were unable to fulfill the unreasonable
Russian demands and sent the them back to their camp empty handed. Poyarkov, angered
by their refusal, ordered his men to attack the Daurs and take the desired supplies by
force.50 Unused to the climate and exhausted by traveling through heavy snow, the
Russians were easily defeated and repulsed bv the Amur natives.
In desperation, Poyarkov made a fatal decision. He ordered seventy men to
attack a nearby Daur settlement. The weak and exhausted men were easily beaten, but
returned to Poyarkov’s camp to find the gates barred and their entrance denied. Poyarkov
had determined that the remaining supplies would allow only part o f the expedition to
survive, and had sentenced the returning men to a slow death through exposure and
starvation. By springtime, forty of the seventy exiled men had died. The remainder
survived through cannibalism. 51
In the spring, Poyarkov reabsorbed these men into the main expedition and
continued down river. He was preceded by stories o f cannibalism and reports o f his

50 Goldcr, 36.
LantzefT, Eastward to Empire. 157.

31

attacks against the Daurs. Natives along the entire length o f the Shilka and Amur rivers
had heard o f the “dirty cannibals” and were alert and defensive.

Every tribe greeted the

Russian aggressively, forcing Poyarkov and his men to quickly flee down river to the
Amur mouth. Once there, Poyarkov forced a local Giliak tribe to provide his group with
provisions for his return trip up the coast to the Ulja river. In comparison with his
frightening journey down the Amur, Poyarkov’s return voyage was uneventful. He
wintered at the mouth o f the Ulja before continuing inland. Traveling along the Maja and
the Aldan rivers, he finally returned to Irkutsk, on June ! 2th,- 1646, with his tale o f the
Amur.
The Russians considered Povarkov’s expedition successful. Although not
profitable, his eyewitness accounts of plentiful game and furs, caches o f oats, peas, barley
and millet along the banks of the Amur showed promise and implied the possibility o f a
reliable food source for Irkutsk. Poyarkov’s report that many natives in the basin claimed
to be under Manchurian protection and the clear evidence o f extensive Chinese trading in
silver, copper and blue painted items indicated that China had a strong presence in the
area.53 Yet, Poyarkov reported, the Amur would be easy to conquer despite the
allegiance to China. He estimated a force o f three hundred men would easily subdue the
natives. He concluded that three ostrogs with fifty men stationed at each could easily

52 Colder, 36.
53 Ibid., 35.
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hold the area while a roving band o f 150 could collect tribute and ensure that peace was

maintained. ^4
While Russia was satisfied with the results o f Poyarkov’s expedition, Poyarkov
had eliminated the possibility for a peaceful acquisition o f the basin. Through his poor
decisions and callous treatment o f both his men and the Amur natives, Poyarkov ensured
the animosity o f the Amur natives. The native population abhorred the barbaric actions o f
the Russians and were repulsed especially by their cannibalism. This antipathy o f the
natives coupled with the fact that Poyarkov’s seven-thousand-verst trek had gathered only
480 sable pelts, and lost 80 men (two-thirds o f his expedition) illustrates the failure o f
Russia’s expedition.55
By the time Poyarkov returned to Irkutsk, the Voevoda, Pushkin had been
replaced by Peter Golovin. Golovin was completely uninterested in pursuing the riches o f
the Amur. He was devoted to rejuvenating Irkutsk and solving the food difficulty through
hard work. He firmly believed that four separate expeditions into the area had been a
waste o f time, resources and manpower that could be better utilized in the Irkutsk area.
Golovin emphatically refused to consider further explorations and completely ignored the
existence o f the Amur.

54 Scbcs, Joseph S. J., “The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty o f Nerchinsk (1689): Diary o f Thomas
Pereira, S. J.” (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1961), 18.
5- Foreman, 107.
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This brief respite lasted until 1649. During this year, Russia made two large
strides toward establishing contact with the Chinese empire. First, Russia dispatched an
ambassadorial mission to the Tsetsen Khan o f the Khalkas. Although the Russian
representatives were primarily interested in discussing silver mines in the Khan’s territory,
they utilized the situation to supplement Russia’s limited knowledge o f the Manchu
dynasty. 56 Russia’s limited information regarding the Manchu dated to 1618. In this
year, Petlin reported that he had experienced difficulties as he traveled to and from Peking
because o f the ongoing battles between the Ming and the Manchu. Later, during the mid
thirties, the Russians had filled a large Manchu goods order and provided weapons,
primarily guns, to the Mongols for delivery into Manchu hands. At the time the request
was considered routine, but it soon became obvious that these weapons were used in the
collapse o f the Ming dynasty.
It was not until the members o f the Tsetsen Khan mission returned to Russia that
more concrete information became available. The messengers reported fully on the state
o f affairs in the budding Manchu empire and brought physical evidence o f the Chinese
desire to communicate. One o f the Russian messengers, Zabolotsky, returned with a letter

-^Baddcley indicates that Baikov was illiterate and so the documents in the Russian record arc written by
another individual. In addition, Baikov did not hand in a ledger of goods for his trip, and there is no
indication that he kept an official book or documents of his trip. There is also no record that indicates
that a clerk was attached to the mission to keep these documents for him. It seems plausible to conclude
that Baikov’s official report was recreated after the mission, nearly a year after the original events
occurred. Several versions of his trip have been recorded but since none can be traced as an ongoing
journal all are suspect. Above is the most widely accepted of all versions recorded by historians and seems
to agree with the historical records. “Baikoff s Embassy 1653-1657,” in Baddelcy, 130-32.
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meant for the Tsar. The document is recorded by Russian sources as the official
correspondence of Djuhandi, the Son o f Van-Li.5?
Unfortunately, Russian records are in error. Van-Li’s eldest son succeed : >.U
father during 1620, but only ruled for one month.58 Since the Ming dynasty lo:”. complete
control over the northern regions of China, it is extremely unlikely that the son o f Van-Li
drafted correspondence to the Russian tsar in 1649. Vincent Chin, a Chinese historian,
believes the document is a letter from a Manchu border official or a regional ruler familiar
with the Russians’ continuing efforts to establish trade. Since the name Djuhandi sounds
more Manchu than Chinese, his conclusions seems accurate. ^
The text o f the letter reads:

In the time ot my father came merchants from the great Lord (Tsar)
to trade; but now no merchants come to me. Now, when in my father’s
time, the Great Lord’s people came, they saw the sun, but now in my time
they do not come. If thy people should come to see me, they would be as
bright as the moon in the sky, and if they come, I shall be very glad; and
will be gracious to them. Thou hast brought me two elk horns, and I have
given in return 700 pieces o f silk and do thou bring me the best o f things
and I will reward you in greater degree and I have sent to the Great Lord
and Zahi (?) thirty-two cups made out o f stone. And the envoys o f the
Great Lord came to me, three men and I ordered those three men to be
convoyed with honour out of my kingdom to the great river and sent to
accompany them, 3000 men for one day’s journey. 60*58960

57 Van-Li ruled China until his death in 1620. His eldest son, Chu Ch’ang-lo, succeed his father using
the reign title T ’ai-ch’ang. He ruled for one month before dying in 1620.
58 Chin, 38.
59 “Pctlin and MundolT,” in Baddclcy, 72-73.
60 Chin, 38.
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Russia’s second stride was the re-infusion o f interest in the Amur basin. Peter
Golovin was replaced by a new official, Dimitri Franzbekov. Franzbekov, in contrast with
the previous Voevoda of Irkutsk, enthusiastically supported exploration in the Amur and
insisted it be given top priority. Almost immediately, he accepted the petition o f an
enterprising peasant, Yarka Pavlov Khabarov, to settle and explore the Amur basin.
Khabarov had been drawn to the Lena area by tales o f easy wealth. A born
businessman, he quickly built a profitable enterprise trading furs for imported provisions.
When Franzbekov’s interest in the Amur became clear, Khabarov quickly petitioned him
for permission to explore the region. Khabarov insisted upon paying his own expenses,
gathering his own men, and requested nothing but Franzbekov’s approval. This venture
seemed risk-less from Franzbekov’s viewpoint and quite possibly could produce an
enormous amount o f wealth for both men. 61
Khabarov departed in March of 1649 with one hundred and fifty men. More
Cossacks eager for wealth joined his expedition as he traveled east. He easily crossed the
mountains on the Olekma river. However, upon Khabarov’s arrival into the Amur region,
he found the countryside deserted. Khabarov and his men passed through three empty
settlements each displaying evidence o f recent population. Shortly after leaving the third,
Khabarov was approached by three horsemen. When Khabarov indicated that they had61

61 Goldcr, 38.
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come as peaceful traders, the native horsemen replied, “Why are you trying to deceive us,
we know you Cossacks.”^2
Memories o f Poyarkov’s previous adventure were apparently very strong, and had
been recently sparked by a small party, consisting of a Russian and three Tungus that had
passed through the region. This group had recently visited the Daur and indicated five
hundred Cossacks were coming with the intention o f killing, plundering the villages and
taking the children into slavery. Naturally the panicked villagers had fled to escape this
Russian h o r d e d
Despite Khabarov’s best efforts the horsemen escaped, avoiding further
questioning. In his effort to capture the riders, Khabarov located two more villages. In
one o f these, he found an old woman too elderly and frail to flee with the remainder o f the
population. Khabarov closely questioned her (she claimed to be the sister o f Lafkai,
leader o f the local natives and o f the horsemen that had confronted Khabarov) about the
entire basin. Khabarov asked questions regarding the surrounding rulers, the natives’
allegiance with China and the relative strength o f Amur defenses. When the elderly
woman refused to speak, Khabarov tortured her until she provided the requested
information. Later, upon his return to Irkutsk on May 26, 1650, Khabarov discovered
the information the woman provided was largely false.62*

62 Scbcs, 19.
^L antzcff, Eastward to Empire. 160-61.
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Despite his initial failure, Khabarov was still confident o f the Amur’s possibilities.

He informed Franzbekov (who relayed to Moscow), that six thousand men would be
required to completely subdue the native settlements. Since the native population was
enormous, he anticipated a sizable force would be needed to ensure control. (In 1662, the
entire population o f the Amur numbered about seventy thousand.) Meanwhile, he happily
indicated that the region was rich enough to completely supply the Irkutsk area with all
needed foodstuffs. He reported large cashes o f grain stored in deep camouflaged pits and
vast numbers o f wildlife and fish available for harvesting.6465Even the transport o f supplies
was ideal. Two weeks o f easy travel on the Zena River were ail that was necessary to
provision Irkutsk.
Khabarov departed upon his second journey into the Amur in 1650. Better
prepared for the land and conditions, Khabarov resupplied his men and strengthened his
company with cannon and horses. He engaged the Dahurs at Yaksa (Albazin), a fortified
native town with triple ramparts and ditches, and ordered the natives to submit and pay
tribute to the Russian tsar. The Dahurs calmly replied they were already bound to the
Bagdoi Khan (the Chinese emperor) and refused Khabarov’s demand.6- Immediately,
Khabarov opened fire upon the unsuspecting natives. The resulting battle lasted from noon
till dark, eventually resulting in a Russian victory. The natives battled valiantly but in the
end bows and arrows were no match for Russian firearms and canon.

64 Foreman, 118.
65 Ibid., 116.

38

Khabarov occupied AJbazin and refortified its walls, making it Russia’s fortified
headquarters on the Amur. Khabarov then dispatched 135 men to pursue the fleeing
natives.

The soldiers followed the natives to their nearby homes, torched them and

triumphantly returned with large amounts o f booty, including 117 head o f captured
cattle. 66
After the skirmish, several onlookers who recorded the incident approached
Khabarov. The individuals were dressed in expensive silk and clearly were unrelats'-1 ‘o
the Albazin natives. Unfortunately, Khabarov and his men had no knowledge o f the
visitors’ language and were unable to effectively communicate. Khabarov offered gifts to
the men as a gesture o f good will, but he was unable to determine more about them and
dismissed the unknown visitors without a second thought . ^
Using Albazin as a fortified base, Khabarov’s men quickly spread throughout the
region, collecting tribute at gun point. The Russians’ methods were brutal. They killed the
native population without hesitation, and for the least infraction. Khabarov seemed
especially bloodthirsty. In his report regarding the subjugation o f the village o f Guigudar,
population one thousand, Khabarov gleefully recorded, “with G od’s help . . . .[sic] we
burned them, we knocked them on the head. . . . [sic] and counting big and liitle we killed6*

66 Golder, 43.
f'7 These men were undoubtedly Chinese officials, most likely there to collect tribute from the Amur
natives. Foreman, 116.
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six hundred and sixty one.”68 Using these methods throughout the Amur. Khabarov’s
men gathered sables, hostages and other booty for transport to Albazin. By fall,
Khabarov’s report boasted that grain to support Irkutsk for more than five years had been
gathered and indicated the Amur natives could easily supply enough grain to feed twenty
thousand if needed.
The natives naturally protested such treatment to the Chinese and requested
immediate assistance. The Chinese dispatched an armed military force to address the
situation.

A single line regarding the resulting battle was recorded in the official Chinese

record: “in the ninth year o f Emperor Shun Chill (1652), Hai Se the Defense Commander
at Ninguta, dispatched troops to attack them (the Locha)69 at the village o f Ujala, but he
suffered a minor defeat.” 70 No further record o f the first battle between Russia and
China was recorded. The Russians, however, described the battle in great detail.
The Russians’ report indicated that they were greatly outnumbered at Ujala and
the Chinese clearly held the advantage. However, because the Chinese commander
ordered his men to capture the Russians rather than shoot to kill, the Chineses’
effectiveness as a military force was destroyed. A rair. o f deadly Russian fire demoralized
the Chinese and forced them to retreat. The Russians claimed 676 Chinese casualties and68970

68 Golder, 45.
69 This was the term the Amur natives attached to the invading Russians. It is unclear at this point that
the Chinese understood that the invaders were Russian and not a wandering Northern tribe that had not
yet been contacted.
70 Chen, Agnes Fang-Chih. “Chinese-Frontier Diplomacy: The Coming o f the Russians and the Treaty of
Nerchinsk.” Ycnching Journal of Social Studies 4 (February 1949), 1311.
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numerous war supplies, including muskets, cannon, provisions, powder, and 830 horses.
Russian casualties, in contrast, were unbelievably light. The Russians claimed only ten
killed and seventy- six w ounded-an unbelievable victory. 71
Despite their military defeat, the Chinese accomplished their main objective, to halt
the harassment o f the natives by the Russian Cossacks. The natives, following China’s
lead began a widespread revolt to drive out the Russian invaders. Threatened on all sides
by discontented natives and undermanned for such an occurrence, Khabarov accepted the
inevitable.72 i n April 1652, Khabarov’s expedition began retreating up the Amur, and
eventually crossed the mountains to Irkutsk. The Chinese instructed the Daurs and other
local tribes to abandon their homelands and move further south into the Sungari region, to
areas where the Russians had not penetrated.
As Khabarov returned to Irkutsk, other Russians prepared to enter the Amur
region with big plans and ambitious dreams. Several expeditions entered tl. j region and
removed food and supplies for consumption at Irkutsk. In ten short years the Amur was
stripped bare by the repetitive foraging expeditions o f the Russians. Where natives had712

71 E. G. Ravenstein, Russians on the Amur (London: Trubncr and Co., 1861), 21. This information is
questionable. Cossacks have a tendency to exaggerate the size of the enemy to promote greater glory.
The Chinese force was most likely not quite as large as estimated. The total number undoubtedly included
a sizable number of servants and bearers who did not participate in the battle. In addition, the Russians
were better armed and positioned than Chinese.
72 John Armstrong Harrison, The Founding of the Russian Empire in Asia and America (Coral Gables.
Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971), 78.

41

cultivated fields and raised cattle, the fields had become deserts, the cattle killed as food
for the Russian fires. The natives were scattered throughout the forest.73*
In 1654, the Russian government moved a significant military force into the region.
Onufrii Stepanov, with a contingent o f 370 strong fighting Cossacks, entered the Amur
and rapidly traversed the region searching for obstinate natives. Three days travel down
the Sunari river, Stepanov’s force engaged an enormous force o f hostile Chinese soldiers
numbering three thousand strong. Outnumbered and lacking sufficient am mnition,
Stepanov retreated to a favorable location at the mouth o f the Khamarch River and
prepared to wait through the long winter months. He ordered the Khamarch osirog built
and sent a raiding party of fifty men to seize grain and supplies from the nearby Gi'iak
population. In a few months reinforcements led by Peter Beketov to assist >n fortifying the
new ostrog.74
When Spring arrived so did the main Chinese army. Stepanov’s report states ten
thousand Chinese arrived and forced a three-week siege at Nerchinsk. The four hundred
Russians were badly outnumbered, but fought with such ferocity and bravery, that they
managed to hold off the enormous Chinese force. The Chinese managed to destroy a few
boats that were stored outside the fort, but did no lasting harm to the ostrog itself.
Eventually, the Chinese ran short o f provisions and were forced to r e t r e a t . T h e y

73 Chen, 1311.
7“* Edmund O. Clubb, China and Russia: the Great Game (London: Columbia University Press, 1971) 23.
73The number o f ten thousand Chinese is certainly exaggerated. This was probably done to impress the
Tsar with the difficulty of Stepanov’s position. Stepanov also indicated that this army had fifteen canon
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instructed the nearby natives, the Ducheri who lived at the mouth of the Sungari, and the
Giliack to burn their homes and relocate to a river out o f the Russians’ reach.
With the advantage o f stealing from the native population gone, Stepanov was
hard pressed to provision his men. Over the next few years, he was attacked repeatedly by
the persistent Chinese. Th< Chinese Record describes the altercation with Stepanov as
follows:
In the twelfth year 1655 Lieutenant-General Mingandali set out with his
forces from Peking. He attacked them (the Lochi) at Ku-mar (Khumarsk)
and other places with some success, but soon retreated owing to lack o f
provisions. In the fourteenth year, Sarguda, defense Commissioner at
Ninguta, defeated them at Shangienuhe. The next year he again defeated
them between the Sungari and the Khulhan rivers. . . . In the seventeenth
year Bahai son o f Sarguda, scored an overwhelming victory over them.
Although successful in the battles, our troops withdrew without
subjugating the Locha, who continued to make their appearance
intermittently. 76

China finally defeated Stepanov on June 30, 1658. Russian records indicate that a
Chinese force of 1400 soldiers attacked the Russians just below the mouth o f the Sungari
River. In a desperate and heroic battle, Stepanov was killed along with 270 o f his finest
Cossack troops. The remaining 220 men managed to escape the battle and flee
northward. O f these survivors, 180 retreated into the surrounding mountains to become *76

and a large number of firearms. In addition, they were not official Chinese troops, but a mixture o f men
from many territories, including Duchcrs, Daurs, Nikans and several others. Mancall, 27.
76 Chen, 1312.
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outlaws. Once again, the Chinese succeeded in halting the Russians’ advance and had
freed the entire lower Amur from the Russian invaders.77
Unfortunately for China, the defeat of Stepanov was not the end o f the Amur
basin’s problem. The Russian’s military defeat was only a temporary measure. Because
Russia still controlled the mountain valleys o f the upper Amur, they maintained a solid
foothold and were able to creep down the Amur’s rivers and re-infest the lower basin.
China’s best hope for a lasting solution was a political agreement between the two
empires. In 1670, The Chinese emperor sent a letter to Russia requesting that the
atrocities committed by the Russian Cossacks be immediately halted and the native
villagers be allowed to live in peace.
The Russians failed to honor this simple Chinese request. Nothing was done to
suspend the Cossacks’ collection o f tribute, nor did Russia respond to the Chinese
Em peror’s letter. Instead, Russia misunderstood the Chinese concern, and assumed that
the Emperor’s letter was an invitation to begin trading negotiations. This7

77 There is a large amount of disagreement in the records. Two stories exist for this encounter. The first
is the Chinese account and is generally considered to be the most accurate o f the two. The second, taken
from Russian source material indicates that a tiny Russian force of roughly four hundred faced an
incredibly large army of three thousand. Two hundred seventy were killed and forty-seven escaped alive to
flee up river. One hundred eighty men deserted before the battle began. Ravenstein, 32-33. Historians
assume that the outlaws remained in the region and eventually joined forces with Tchemigofski in 1665
but little evidence supports this conclusion.

44

miscommunication, however, was not unusual for Russia. Her entire political history with
the Manchu dynasty is filled with miscommunications, misunderstandings and incorrect
assumptions.

CHAPTER 2: THE FIRST MISSIONS

The confision and misinterpretation began with the Baikov mission o f 1654. The
Tsar, Aleksei Mikhailovich, selected Fedor Isakovich Baikov in February 1654, to initiate
friendly relations with the young Manchu dynasty and organize the foundation for future
large scale trade. To accomplish this mission, Baikov was charged with a number o f
smaller tasks to promote good will and continuing relations. The first o f these congenial
tasks was to personally hand the Emperor a letter from the Tsar welcoming Chinese
traders to Moscow. Many lavish and expensive gifts were to accompany this document to
bolster friendship between the two nations. Once Baikov had delivered these important
offerings, he was to discover if Russian merchants, envoys and ambassadors were
welcome in the Chinese capital o f Peking. Finally, Baikov was to learn Chinese
ceremonial rites and customs, especially when they pertained to ambassadors and political
envoys, to insure future meetings between the nations would facilitate peaceful
relations.78
Baikov was also given a second, more covert mission—to discover sensitive
military information about China. To enhance Russia’s understanding o f the distant and
remote country' and better prepare her for the possibility o f hostile action, Baikov was 78

78 Chin, 49.
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instructed to take particular note o f China’s military, the type and size o f weaponry,
population size, economic stability, and numerous other issues used to determine the
military strength. Baikov’s instructions even included noting all possible entry routes into
the country that could be used for either military or commercial means.79
While Baikov accomplished these tasks, he was required to follow a rigid protocol.
To insure that his position and authority were not demeaned, the Tsar instructed Baikov
to refrain from bowing, groveling or kissing the feet o f the Chinese emperor. Baikov was
forbidden to perform any act that indicated that the Tsar was inferior or subordinate in any
way.^0 The only exception to this stringent instruction was if the Em peror’s hand was
proffered. In such an instance Baikov could kiss the hand in the traditional European
fashion.

Unfortunately this ridged charge gave Baikov little latitude to adapt to the

unusual and unanticipated Chinese customs.
Baikov began his mission in typical European fashion. He instructed an intelligent
and savvy messenger, Setkul Ablin to proceed him into China. Ablin’s task was to inform
the Chinese that the Russian emissary was en route and ensure that adequate supplies and7980*

79 “ 1654 Instructions From the Prikaz of the Bolshaia Kazan to Fedor Baikof concerning his embassy to
the Chinese Empire,” in Dmytryshyn, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia. 254.
80 Chin, 49.
8 'Baikov was instructed that he could, as in European courts, kiss the Emperor’s hand but was strictly
instructed that under no circumstances was he to kiss his feet or act in any other demeaning manner.
“ 1654 Instructions From the Prikaz of the Bolshaia Kazan to Fedor Baikof concerning his embassy to the
Chinese Empire,” in Dmytryshyn, 288.
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transportation were provided inside China’s borders. Ablin departed Moscow with a small
group o f men and a few furs and gifts that they hoped to trade with in China. ^
Upon his arrival in China in 1655, Ablin was treated exceptionally well—too well
for a simple messenger. China had misunderstood his purpose and had assumed that he
was Russia’s representative. The Chinese Record recorded that Ablin arrived to provide
tribute and inquire o f the Emperor’s health and well being. 83 However because Ablin did
not provide an official letter from the Tsar, he was dismissed. However, the Chinese were
pleased with the Russians’ effort to become civilized and honored Ablin as the first tribute
embassy to reach China from Russia. They gladly accepted Ablin’s meager gifts o f furs
and encouraged the Russians by sending gifts in return and entertaining Ablin throughout
his stay. Ablin was given verbal instructions that the Tsar should send tribute every year.
Ablin himself was given personal permission to return and trade freely with Chinese
merchants as long as his merchandise v/as offered for trade to the Emperor first. ^4 His
mission completed, Ablin departed Peking several months prior to Baikov’s arrival.
Although he hoped to meet the Russian envoy en route, he returned to Russian territory
along a different route. Ablin completely missed Baikov’s entourage and was unable to
warn him about the peculiarities of the Chinese court.8283485

82 Chin, 50.
83 Chin, 55.
84 Chen, 1321
85 Chin, 54.
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Baikov approached the Chinese border and arrived at Kuku-sui, the firs: Chinese
city in Mongol territory. At this location, he was refused transportation, food, and other
supplies because the Chinese officials had no knowledge o f his arrival. The Chinese
repeatedly indicated that they could not follow the customary procedure without first
receiving authorization from the Emperor.

The Kuku-sui officials did suggest that the

Russian group travel onward to Kapka (Kalgan), a Chinese town on the frontier. At this
location, Baikov and his men again requested food and transportation, but they received
the same answer. They could not assist him without written authorization. Kapka officials
did, however, dispatch a message to Peking requesting permission to supply Baikov’s
entourage and assist him on his journey to the Chinese capital city. In a few weeks Baikov
was completely supplied and allowed to continue toward Peking.
On March 3rd, Baikov finally arrived at the capital city and was immediately
greeted by the Li Fan Yuan, the Chinese Privy Council. ^8 Immediately, Baikov’s
difficulties began. When members o f the Li Fan Yuan escorted Baikov and his entourage
to the city gate, they instructed him to kneel before entering. Baikov refused explaining

86 Chin, 50.
87 Ibid.
88 The Li Fan Yuan was a special ministry set up to ensure China maintained superiority' over their inner
Asian allies. Acting primarily as a court of Colonial affairs, the Li Fan Yuan was responsible for ensuring
that China’s allies obeyed the proper protocol and provided suitable tribute. There is some dispute as to
where and when he met the Privy' Council. In later contacts the Privy Council met foreign groups near the
border and prevented their approach to Peking if the proper protocol was not followed. However, none of
the records indicate that this occurred. All versions recorded in Russian archives indicate that this first
meeting occurred at the city of Peking. Perhaps the difficulties encountered by the Chinese in dealing
with Baikov prompted the Chinese to alter their original procedures. Chen, 1322.
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that these customs were not the Russian way and he and his men could not perform this
ritual. The council members accepted his explanation and allowed the Russians to
continue to their quarters without requiring further prostrations. ^9
Once Baikov was settled, the Emperor sent Baikov a special delicacy o f tea boiled
with butter and mare’s milk as a special goodwill gift. Baikov refused to accept this gift
claiming the Russians were observing a religious period of fasting. Eventually, he was
persuaded to accept the expensive delicacy and satisfy Chinese custom even though he
returned the cup’s contents untouched.90
The next controversy arose as the Li Fan Yuan began the preparations to present
Baikov to the Emperor. Chinese custom dictated that both Baikov’s letter o f introduction
and his official gifts be examined to insure their suitability for presentation to the Emperor.
After this ritual, Baikov wou! 1 be escorted to the Emperor. Baikov, however, insisted that
this was unacceptable. Proper European custom dictated that an envoy be received
immediately. He was entrusted to personally deliver his documentation to the ruler and
allow no one else to view it before this task was completed. Gifts were only exchanged
after official greeting and discussions had taken place.91
The Li Fan Yuan were unable to reason with Baikov. He stubbornly refused to
follow Chinese traditions. Unwilling to argue the point, the council used force to relieve

89 Chen, 51.

90 Ibid.
91 Chen, 132?..

50

Baikov o f his official gifts. Two days after this event the council returned, indicating
Baikov’s gifts had been received by the Emperor. Now the Li Fan Yuan requested that
Baikov relinquish the Tsar’s letter for review. Again, Baikov refused claiming his
instructions required him to personally deliver the document. Dismayed, the officials
relented and returned to Emperor empty handed. Five months passed without further
contact with the Chinese officials. 92
Finally on the 12th o f August, the Li Fan Yuan again visited Baikov. It had been
decided, they informed him, that he could personally carry his letter to the Ministry. In
preparati on for this event, Baikov would be schooled in the complexities o f the kowtow
and court procedures. However, Baikov emphatically refused to perform the kowtow.
The kowtow, he explained, was a gesture o f subservience. His Tsar had expressly forbade
him to perform such an action. The council threatened the envoy with death if he
continued to refuse, but even this threat failed to sway Baikov’s resolve. He steadfastly
declared, "though the Emperor should order that I be tom limb from limb, yet will I not go
to the Ministry . . . . nor give up to you the Tsar's gracious letter.” The Chinese were

92 Between March 5th and August 12th, Baikov and his men were interred in a small courtyard and
denied visitors and opportunities to trade. The only contacts outside of this compound were with court
dignitaries who had received special permission to approach the Russian visitors. The Chinese
maintained this was for two reasons. First, it ensured that the Russians would not be insulted or han.ied
during their stay in Peking, and second since Baikov was unwilling to provide documentation to prove his
claim o f a diplomatic mission, it ensured that Baikov could not trade. (China did not allow diplomatic
missions to engage in wide-scale trading.) Ibid.
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completely disgusted with Baikov’s behavior. They unceremoniously returned the Russian
gifts and ordered the envoy to depart immediately. 93
One day outside the capital city, Baikov realized that his mission was a complete
failure. Quickly he sent a messenger, a lowly cook from his envoy, back to Peking to
plead his case. Claiming it was his official instructions that caused him to refuse to
relinquish his letter and kowtow, Baikov requested forgiveness and pleaded to be allowed
to readdress this misunderstanding. He asked that the Emperor order him back to Peking,
and assured the ruler that he would obey all commands in every respect. Once he had
dispatched the cook with this message, Baikov continued on to the next sizable town,
Kapka, to await, a respcnse.94
The next day a courtier arrived to confirm the content o f Baikov’s message. Seven
days later, he returned with the Chinese response. He explained that it was disgraceful
for Baikov to continue onward to the next town. Instead, he should have waited for a
response at the same location that he dispatched the cook.95 The message he carried was
similar in content. “He who behaves in such a manner cannot be in his right mind. He
professes to have been sent from the great lord, from the orthodox Tsar but has not the
slightest inkling how to show respect to a sovcreign”96

93 Ibid.
94 Chin, 53.
95 Chin, 53-54.
96 “The Statcnii Spisok,” in Baddelcly, 152.
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Baikov’s actions, however, are not as benign as he wanted the Tsar to believe. A
Dutch ambassador was in Peking during both the Ablin and Baikov missions and made a
detailed report on the actions o f both in his record. Nieuhoff, the Dutch representative,
recorded the positive influence and reputation o f Ablin, but could not do the same for
Baikov. He indicated that Baikov was at fault for the negative Chinese response. Upon
the Russian envoy’s arrival, he and his delegation were allowed to travel freely, buying
and selling whatever they wished. However after one month, the Russians’ actions were
so repulsive ard reprehensible that the Chinese were forced to restrain them. Nieuhcfif
reports they repeatedly forced their way into brothels, were noisy, drunken, and
disrespectful and were the focus o f numerous scandals and disputes.
Even Baikov’s heartfelt report of his attempt to appeal to the Chinese takes on a
new light when retold by Nieuhoff. Nieuhoff recorded that the Russians were detained
just outside the city walls because they had no passport from the Emperor allowing them
exit. Baikov wus forced to send people back to humbly apologize for the arrogant and
disrespectful actions both he and his men committed during their visit. He was then
required to beg to make amends so they could depart. These humble apologies were thus
accepted by the Emperor.98
Baikov’s mission was a complete failure. Russia had learned little o f Chinese
customs and had failed to gain trading rights to solve their economic crisis. The mission

97 Chin, 54.
98 Ibid.
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succeeded only in demonstrating the atrocious manners o f the Russians and ensuring
Manchu negativity toward a Russian trade alliance.09
In 1558, shortly after this disastrous mission, a second envoy was dispatched to
repair the damage caused by Baikov’s ill-fated mission. Periliev and Setkul Ablin were
tasked to reestablish positive relations and negotiate a lucrative trade agreement. To
avoid the difficulties experienced by Baikov, Russia sent Ablin and Periliev as simple
messengers, not envoys or ambassadors. This way, the messengers avoided the custom
arguments Baikov encountered. As messengers, the two could kowtow and prostrate
themselves, since they did not directly represent the persona o f the Tsar. Russia also
declared that if delivering the Tsar’s letter directly to the Emperor was prohibited, Ablin
and Periliev were authorized to relinquish it the proper Chinese authorities.
The team arrived in Peking in 1660, and immediately kowtowed and relinquished
the Tsar’s letter to the Li Fan Yuan. 100 Because Ablin and Periliev v/ere polite,
agreeable, willing to accept Chinese customs, they were well accepted and treated with
deference and respect. Quietly, they dispensed their own personal gifts to influential
Chinese officials to facilitate their right to trade for Chinese goods. The pair’s trading
rights were quickly approved, and they established a friendly and very profitable trade.

99 At this time, Stepanov had entered the Amur region and was actively battling the Chinese. This
certainly influenced the Chinese attitude toward the Russian ambassador and was a factor in his failure.

500 Mancall, 57.
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Unfortunately for Russia, this amounted only to private trade, authorized only to Ablin
and his men as a gesture o f benevolence. 1®*
The Chinese were much less satisfied with the Russian government. The letter
Ablin delivered was disrespectful, insulting and lacked humility and courtesy. The
document’s presumptuous air infuriated the Chinese and they lectured Ablin and Periliev
on the letter’s shortcomings to ensure that in the future such insulting practices would be
avoided. ^ 2 The official Chinese response was recorded in the Chinese record as “the
Emperor reciprocated the Tsar’s friendship with the reply that “ the tribute thou didst send
we have accepted, and in return we send thee our gifts and favours.” ^
Ablin maintained good relations with China in the following years and profited
greatly from his Chinese trading operation. He made one mere trips in 1668 and left a
lasting favorable impression with the Chinese traders. Unfortunately, Ablin’s trips to
Peking were strictly private ventures, and he made little progress establishing trading
rights for Russia. China absolutely refused to allow state-sponsored expeditions to enter
the empire and steadfastly forbade Chinese traders to make the trek to Moscow. ’04

101 Albin’s second mission which, occurred in 1668, was immensely profitable. In addition to acquiring
a large amount o f silk velvet tea and spice, Albin’s mission made a favorable impression upon the
Manchu. Albin dined three times in the Emperor’s garden, was granted personal use o f an interpreter to
assist in the trading process, and was explicitly told that all Russian merchants were welcome in China
and w'culd receive “sustenance and all kinds of considerations.” Mancall, 58.
102 The letter used the Russian calendar instead of the Chinese and the Emperor’s titles were incorrectly
listed. Naturally, both of these faults were unavoidable. Even in the mid 1660’s, Russia lacked a working
knowledge o f the Chinese calendar and official contacts had not returned with the proper list o f the
Emperor’s official titles. Chin, 57.
1°3 Chin, 58.
1°4 Chin, 60.
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The failure o f these early envoys can be primarily attributed to China’s world view.
Unlike European nations, China’s isolation caused them to believe that the world was
divided into two distinct parts, the civilized and the barbaric. The civilized world
encompassed all o f the enlightened Chinese empire and extended beyond territorial
boundaries to all people accepting the suzerainty o f the Chinese Emperor. The rest,
regardless o f achievement, were viewed as lowly barbarians. The Russian tsar, as a
northern prince, naturally was an uncivilized barbarian. The Chinese were willing to
accept these barbarians into the civilized world. They demanded only a reasonable tribute,
T tlutc acceptance o f the Emperor’s autiioiily, and performance o f all Chinese traditionai
customs and rituals. The Chinese fervently believed that the barbarians beyond China’s
walls needed only to be shown the proper path and they would join the ranks o f the
enlightened. 1^5
For the Chinese, enlightenment meant accepting the authority o f the emperor.
M ore than simply the country’s ruler, the emperor was an integral part o f Chinese life and
religion. They believed that the emperor was the single contact point between heaven and
earth. As the bridge between the mundane and the divine, he played a dual role, one as
Tien-tzu, the son of heaven, and the other as the man-Luang-ti. As Tien-tzu, the emperor
must ensure the virtue o f the son o f heaven in order to ensure the harmony o f the marriage

105 Williams, 194-95.
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between heaven and earth. As Luang-ti, he must minimize the fallibility o f human nature
in order to protect the universe from dissonance.
To assist the emperor in balancing the delicate nature o f these two roles, the
Chinese had organized a exceptionally rigid ard complex series o f rituals. These rituals,
the Chinese believed, protected both earth and heaven and were necessary to ensure
harmony. The rituals surrounding an imperial audience, for example, were designed to
ensure the persona o f Tien-tzu was present rather than the fallible Luang-ti. This would
ensure a positive outcome. To the Chinese, the centuries-old rituals were more firmly
ingrained that any Christian belief. They firmly maintained that to alter the procedures
would risk the destruction o f both earth and heaven. The Russians, in contrast, examined
the missions with European eyes. They aw very little difference between the missions o f
Ablin and Baikov. Both carried similar messages and performed similar roles. Only one
major difference separated the two officials, rank.
In European politics, the fact that Baikov was an official envoy and Ablin was
simply a humble messenger, is a significant difference. Baikov, as an official envoy,
represented the government o f Russia and wielded authoritative powers to establish policy
and represent the Russian government in political discussions. Ablin however, was a
lowly messenger. He, representing only himself, lacked the authority to do more than
deliver an official letter and carry back a response. Considering this, the enthusiastic
welcome the Chinese gave to Ablin was a shocking and unusual response. The fact that

106Ibid.
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Ablin willingly kowtowed while Baikov refused was viewed as insignificant. The Russians
deduced the Chinese must be responding to the distinct difference o f status between the
two officials.
There were very few reasons for a country to respond emphatically to a lowly
messenger. Russia concluded that China was utilizing Ablin to proffer an apology for past
actions. If the Chinese had dismissed Baikov without fully realizing his status and mission
o f establishing trade, they quite easily could utilize Ablin to proffer an apology. By
welcoming Ablin whole-heartedly, they could compensate for their earlier mistake.
While this conclusion explained China’s unusual actions, it assumed several facts
about Chinese political procedure. First, it assumed that the Chinese fully understood the
nuances o f status and official positions and the subtleties o f their use. Second, it believed
that Ablin’s enthusiastic welcome signified China’s desire to establish relations and
establish trade. Third and finally, it meant that China’s actions revealed that she had an
excellent idea o f Russia’s rank, position, and power. With these basic assumption about
China’s understanding of foreign relations, Russia prepared her foreign policy. While
contemplating relations with China, Russia ignored the Amur. With Stepanov defeated
and the prospect of creating a lasting relationship with China in the air, Russia decided to
stop authorizing official missions into the Amur.
Although no more official missions entered the Amur, Russia was unable to stop
refugees and criminals from fleeing into the region. In 1665, Nikiphor Romanov
Tchemigofski, a Polish exile wanted for the murder o f the Voevoda o f Ilimsk, had fled
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into the Amur to escape punishment. Traveling with him was a band o f eighty-four
fugitives. This bold group braved battle with the Chinese forces to reinhabit Albazin,
Khabarov’s primary fort, and reestablish Russian dominance in the region. Tchernigofski
and his followers mercilessly exacted tribute and established a chain o f fortresses along the
Amur. Once they were well established, the group petitioned the Tsar for full pardons and
in 1669 indicated they would submit to the Tsar’s authority. Because o f their outstanding
progress in the basin, the Tsar decided to grant the fugitives complete pardons and sent
government officials to oversee the area. ^

jn a short period o f time, Albazin had grown

to a strong force o f three hundred men.
From Tchemigofski’s fortress, the Russians crept downstream. They
gradually became braver and more self-assured when it became apparent that the Chinese
military force that had protected the southern basin had withdrawn. In a short period,
Russia was again extracting tribute from the Amur natives with impunity. In fact, the
Russians became so self-assured they openly attacked a Chinese tribute delegation sent by
the Chinese emperor, Shan Chin, proclaiming their authority in the region.
China had difficulties of her own during this period. China was left with only one
option to protect the basin from this persistent invader. Since her military was engaged in
battling an open revolt to the south and could nut be spared to settle the thirty-year-old
territorial dispute, K'and Hsi, the new Chinese emperor, resorted to diplomacy to resolve

107 Hsuan-min, 396-97.
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the issue. He instructed the Military-Governor of Ninguta to send a letter to Nerchinsk in
early 1670. The Chinese letter was simple. It complained of Russian encroachments on the
Amur natives and the reprehensible behavior o f the Russian traders who extorted them.
Finally, the emperor indicated his displeasure at the Russian protection o f a Chinese traitor
by the name o f Gantimer. 108
The letter was received by Daniel Archunski the Voevoda o f Nerchinsk later that
same year. The Chinese detachment assigred to deliver the message carefully translated
the document and explained in great detail the Emperor’s concerns.

Archunski

apparently misunderstood the importance o f this document. He probably felt that this
letter was from a lesser prince, a Mongol tribesman, perhaps, complaining o f the Cossack
activities near his homeland.
Archunski had been instructed by Moscow that when contacting the lesser tribal
groups, he was to request that they submit to the Tsar, impressing on them the
overwhelming strength and greatness o f the Russian empire. Following these instructions,

Gantimer was a Tunguse prince who ruled in the region o f Nercha (Nerchinsk). He became
dissatisfied with Russian demands in 1650 and moved his people to the right bank of Argun where he
proclaimed his support of the Chinese rule. Throughout the Khabarov and Stepanov invasions, he
steadfastly supported China and even assisted them in the battle at Kamarsk. But in 1666-1667, Gantimer
abandoned the Chinese and joined the Russians. China labeled him a traitor and demanded his
extradition. Russia, however, refused. Gantimer was a prominent chief and leader and greatly influenced
the surrounding tribal loaders. His friendship and support of Russia not only smoothed the path for
Russian control, but greatly degraded the allegiance of surrounding Tungus chieftains toward China.
Baddeley, 428-429. China also desired the return of Gantimur’s nephew, Tokultci. He had lived with the
Targachuns, steadfast loyal subjects o f China, and killed three Targachin men. To escape punishment,
Tokultei fled to his uncle and Russian protection. Chen, 132.
109 No indication of the explicit translation is made evident in his report to Moscow. Furthermore, no
documentation exists to support the claim that Moscow had received a translation o f the important
document.
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Archunski drafted a letter and entrusted it to Ignashka Miiovanov, an illiterate Cossack,
for delivery to the Chinese emperor. The letter read in part:
There are Tsars and Kings who own allegiance to the Great Lord
Tsar and Grand Prince, Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat o f all the Russias,
Great, Little and White and the Great Lord graciously designs to extend
them to his royal gifts and favour.
The Bogdoi Tsar (Chinese Emperor) would do well to seek
likewise the favour and presents o f the Grand Prince, Alexei Mikhailovich.
Autocrat o f all the Russias, Great, Little and White, and place himself
under His Tsarial Majesty's protection.
And the Grand Prince, Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat o f all the
Russias, Great, Little and White, and lord and possessor o f many
kingdoms, will in that case send the Bogdikhan gifts and keep him in his
gracious royal care, and protect him from his enemies.
At the same time the Bogdikhan would come under the Tsarial
Majesty's, the Great Lord’s, high hand for ever [sic] without fail, and
present to him . the Great Lord, tribute and allow the Great Lord's people
and his own, on either side, to trade freely.
And what the Bogdikhan decides let him forward to His Tsarial
Majesty, the Great Lord, by those same envoys. * ^

The letter continues and informs the Emperor that Gantimer is too ill and elderly to
be returned without the express permission o f the Tsar, but does promise to restrain
Cossack activities in the region. 11 *
Surprisingly, this haughty and disrespectful letter was extremely well received in
Peking. * ^

K'ang Hsi was encouraged by the prompt Russian response and the

110 Chen, 1324.
111 Chin, 60.
1 ^B ecau se Kang Hsi accepted Archunski’s disrespectful document without even a hint of anger suggests
that the Emperor was unaware of the letter’s true contents. Baddclcy speculates that the Emperor never
understood that the document demanded his fidelity. He believes the letter was translated by a clerk or
Jesuit priest unwilling to raise the ire of the Emperor and who suppressed its more offensive passages.
“MilovanoiTs Mission to Peking, 1670,” in Baddcley, 195.
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willingness o f the Russian messenger to kowtow and follow Chi nese customs. He allowed
Milovanov a personal audience, the first Russian so honored, and immediately began
writing his own response to inform the Russians o f his restraint and benevolence. *^
...Long since, our hunters sent a humble address declaring that those who
dwell on the Black River are lovchi, petty robbers, in no great strength, but
that those lovchi maltreat our Djurdji and Takori {Dahurs}, and catch their
sables, and , withal, they humbly report o f Gantimur that, relying on those
lovchi, he has fled to them and trusts them. They petitioned therefor that
those lovchi should be punished. But I, Ruler o f the World, hearing that
those lovchi were thy subjects sent a man to find out what was true and
what false. And that Danilo sent ten messangers with Ignatii, and when
they announced that they had thy authority and were subjects o f thine, I
beleived them. But now, if thou desirest to dwell in peace, send us the
refugee Gantimer. Also, in future, let none make any trouble on our
frontiers, if this is done there will be peace; that is why I send this
letter.J

The Emperor’s presentation of the situation is a polite, political threat. In his
correspondence, he indicated that Russia had violated the territorial rights o f China in the
Amur basin, and that China was fully capable and willing to retaliate against this Russian
invasion. However, because political considerations have restrained his hand, the Emperor
decided to allow Russia the opportunity to correct their transgression. As a result, the
Chinese Emperor did not order retribution but instead informed the Russian tsar o f the
situation in order to provide him with the opportunity to correct the situation. Yet the

’ I-* Ablin and Pcrlief were apparently denied this honor because of the disrespcctfi' tone of the Tsar's
letter. Yuri Nikolaevich Semenov, Siberia. Its Conquest and Development, translatcu by J. R. Foster
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1954), 110.
1 There arc several translations to this letter. This one was done by the Jesuit priest, Vcrbicst.
“MilovanofTs Mission to Peking (1670),” in Baddclcy, 373.
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Emperor’s warning is very clear. 'I he letter unequivocally states that the Amur is a
Chinese holding and that the conditions that Russia must meet to remain within the Amur
is a peaceful and harmonious relationship with the Amur natives.
Since this plainly worded note was the most recent communication between the
Russian and Chinese empires, it is obvious that China assumed the next communication
from Russia would deal at least peripherally with the Amur basin topic. Such a bold and
authoritative declaration should be featured in the next communication, especially since
every communication from China had concentrated on the Amur topic and highlighted
their discontent with the Russian occupation.
The Russian viewpoint on the Amur basin subject was noticeably different. To
them it was not a primary concern. Russian Cossacks had dominated most o f the region
for several decades and the few military skirmishes, while costly, were insubstantial in
comparison with the vast quantities of expensive pelts shipped from the region each year
China’s feeble efforts to remove the Cossacks were not especially threatening and unless a
massive military operation was organized, it was unlikely that Russia would be forced out
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o f the Amur. US It was into this difficult and conflicting political atmosphere that Russia
would send their representative.*

* ^ Russian officials would claim that they were unable to read the communications from China.
Although this point may have some validity, especially in the case o f the earlier documents from 1618 and
1649, (These early documents were received during a time when there was very little communication with
Chinese-speaking peoples.) numerous individuals from Siberia and the Amur basin could translate these
late, documents with little difficulty. In addition, the great effort China underwent to ensure that the
Milovanov letter was understood shc-.’d h v ~ w!!evir.red most o f Russia’s difficulties and ensured that
Russia could develop at least a rudimentary foreign policy.

CHAPTER 3: THE MAKING OF A DIPLOMATIC MISSION

Russia’s decision in 1674 to send an ambassadorial mission to China was
prompted by economic factors and a belief in the ease o f widespread trade with the
Chinese. The vision o f heavily loaded caravans filled with expensive Chinese silks, gems,
and spices prompted excited officials to immediately begin preparations for the mission.
In addition to the selection and organization o f supplies and suitable gifts, and the
rounding up the best qualified men in numerous fields—such as medicine, warfare, farming,
etc.—to observe and record information, two vitally important tasks needed to be
accomplished. First, a suitable ambassador had to be selected to present the proper image
to the Chinese. And second, a set o f instructions tailored to the fallibility o f the selected
ambassador and providing detailed explanations of the complexities o f the mission needed
to be created.
The choice o f the ambassador was vital. The chosen individual would be the first
official representative o f Russia in the distant Chinese empire. The task o f establishing a
positive political relationship and negotiating trade was crucial to Russia’s political
stability. The tremendous importance of this mission for Russia demanded a unique and
unusual individual-a person gifted with exceptional intelligence, education, and political
experience to properly represent the throne in this important endeavor. Additionally, the
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selected individual, as the official representative o f the Tsar abroad, must present the
proper bearing, appearance, and attitude to impress upon the Chinese the grandeur o f the
Russian throne. For this particular task, A. A. Matveev,! *6 the Tsar’s close confidant,
presented a young Moldavian diplomat, Nikolai Gavrilovich Milescu Spafarii,! 17 for
consideration to the post.
Spafarii was an extremely controversial choice to become the Russian ambassador
to China. Numerous Russian officials complained that Spafarii was too young. At only
forty years o f age, Spafarii lacked the distinction to be taken seriously as a political
negotiator. 118 In addition, Spafarii was extremely inexperienced in Russian politics.
Because Spafarii had arrived in Moscow in 1671, only four years earlier, without even the
basic rudiments o f the Russian language, Spafarii had not had the opportunity to
distinguish himself through his negotiation skills. His position in the foreign office had
been gained on the strength o f his Greek and Latin abilities and the strong
recommendations from Nikusi Panagiot, a Greek interpreter at the Porte, and from the

1 16 Artemon A. Matveev was the head of the Polosolskii Prikaz, the Russian foreign office that managed
foreign affairs including the assignment of translators.
117 One well-known comprehensive biography had been written on Spafarii, P. P. Panaitescu, Nicolas
Snathat M ilescu. Melanges de l ’ecole roumanine en France, Pt. I (Paris, np. 1925). Mark MancalFs
Russia and China liberally uses this work in its preparation of Spafarii’s biography. Nicholi Milescu is
usually referred to as Spafarii. Mancall explains that this is a misuse o f his title, spatar or spatharios, by
previous historians. However, since ail Russian documents and Spafarii himself in his letters and journal
use Spafarii, it seems appropriate to continue the practice. Mancall, 324.
118 There is a dispute regarding Spafarii’s age. In 1676, Spafarii stated that he was forty years old (thus
born in 1636). But all known recards including those by the Romanian chronicler Ncculcea indicated his
date of birth was about 1625. Due to the fact that their is no concrete proof o f Spafarii’s age, historians
have generally accepted the 163!) date. This is primarily because Ncculcca’s early works arc often
inaccurate. This would make Spafarii seventeen when he completed his education in 1653. Ibid., 324.
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Patriarch o f Jerusalem (residing in Constantinople), Dositheos.' ^

Spafarii’s short

residency and lack o f practical experience in Russian diplomacy brought his ability to
successfully navigate the complexities o f political negotiation into question.
Practical considerations were, however, only part o f the controversy. Spafarii’s
nationality (born in Moldavia) and low birth challenged his suitability. His family’s Greek
origins created a mild debate. It was his family’s humble origins that caused the most
concern. Sp'.farii’s family was originally without a name, title or wealth. To obtain a more
prosperous life, Spafarii’s parents migrated to Moldavia and married into two wealthy and
influential households, the Ghika and Duka families. After achieving noble rank through
their newly acquired in-laws, Spafarii’s family adopted a family name, Milescu, from an
estate they procured in Basluisk. 120 Spafarii presented the appearance o f wealthy and
influential origins but he was stili a member o f the lower class and unsuitable for such an
important position.
The arguments accumulated against Spafarii were for the most part simply political
excuses. A non-Russian representative of the throne, while unusual, was certainly
acceptable by Russian standards in the late seventeenth century. His inexperience could be
overcome by assigning numerous advisors to the mission to assist him with the
complexities o f Russian politics. Youth, far from being a deterrent, was often considered
an asset on long and difficult treks through the untamed wilderness. Yet despite these

l l 9 Baddeley, 206.
120 Ibid., 205.
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reasons, Spafarii was unpalatable to a large number o f Russian politicians. The reason
was Spafarii’s friendship with A. A. Matveev. 121
Artemon Matveev maintained a unique position in the Russian government. In
addition to his influential position as head of the foreign affairs department, Matveev was
closely related to the Tsar’s family. As the favored uncle o f Tsar Aleksei’s second wife,
Natalia Narishkin, Matveev enjoyed influence unnatural to his post. The Tsar usually
sanctioned Matveev’s recommendations despite protests from the remainder o f his
government and Spafarii was readily approved as the ambassador to China despite the
outcry from the Miloslavskaia faction o f the government. 122
M atveev’s relationship with Spafarii began shortly after he arrived in Moscow.
Interested in developing a new policy that would allow for the formation o f natural allies
against a common enemy, Matveev required an assistant with information on the recent
state o f European affairs. He recruited the young translator and utilized his foreign
background and European political ties to cement alliances against Turkey. This
professional relationship quickly became personal. Matveev enjoyed the intellectual
stimulation offered by Spafarii, and often invited him to socialize and discuss religious or
historical texts. Spafarii eventually became a tutor for Matveev’s son, Andrei. Naturally,*

121 Ibid., 207
*22 The faction that controlled the government during the reign of Aleksei’s first wife, Maria
Miloslavskaia. Sergei M. Soloviev, Rebellion and Reform: Fedor and Sophia 1682-1689. vol. 25, History'
o f Russia, translated and edited by Lindsey A. J. Hughes (Guff Breeze, Fla: Academic International Press,
1989), 10.
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when the lucrative position o f Russian ambassador to China became available, Matveev
strongly suggested the young Moldavian to the Tsar. 123
Matveev’s influential support certainly assisted Spafarii in receiving the assignment
but this aid should not overshadow Spafarii’s natural and unique qualifications. Perhaps
o f all the other Russian diplomats of the period, Spafarii alone commanded the diverse
skills necessary to complete the mission. First, Spafarii was highly educated. As a young
man, his family managed to send him to the prestigious Greek Patriarchal School in
Constantinople. Under the tutelage o f Gabriel Vlasi, who would become the metropolitan
o f Naupaktu and Arta, Spafarii absorbed several languages, including ancient and modem
Greek, Turkish and Arabic. His studies included a rigorous exploration o f literature,
history, and philosophy. Theology, Spafarii’s passion, became deeply ingrained and he
would spend much o f his professional career addressing the heady issues o f church dogma.
When Spafarii completed the difficult program at Constantinople, he traveled to Italy to
explore more mundane subjects that included natural science, mathematics, Italian and
Latin. 124
Spafarii’s amazing academic abilities brought hirn praise both from fellow students
and instructors. Terms including “oti vir Poliglotus,” “instruit aux iangues,” “vsem
yazikam,” “vir ac pius” and “in urbe imperatoria” were used to describe him. The
patriarch, Dositheus, was so impressed by Spafarii’s linguistic ability and his expertise in*

*23 Mancall, 74.
124 Probably Padua. Baddclcy, 205.
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theology that he exclaimed, "He is, as it were, a grancgraph, replete with universal
knowledge.” 125
Spafarii proved his command o f religious theory' and linguistical ability in his first
few professional works. One o f the Spafarii’s earliest works was the difficult translation
o f the bibie from Greek into Rumanian/ Moldavian. This enormous work became widely
used during the seventeenth century before disappearing during the nineteenth. 126
Spafarii’s second ambitious and most famous work centered upon the Calvinist movement
o f Europe. In an extensive document entitled Enchiridion. Sive Stella Orientalis
Occidentali Splendens, hoc est Sensus Ecclesiae Orientalis. Scilicet Graecae. de
Transubstantiatione Corporis Domini AJiisque Controversiss. 127 Spafarii examined the
Calvinist treatise against Transubstantiation in great detail. In his work, he explained that
the fundamental basis o f the Calvinist movement was based upon the “Catechesis o f
Cyril.” a religious address supposedly delivered by Cyril, patriarch o f Constantinople.
Spafarii’s intensive examination proved decisively that the Catechesis was a forgery and
the basis for the Calvinist movement heresy. *28
Spafarii’s extensive years at European courts also provided him with the
experience necessary to become the Russian ambassador. In 1653, when Spafarii was 12567*

125 ibid.
126 j b e work was never published. Mancall, 71.
127 The title is translated as Manual if the Eastern Star Singing on the West...being the Perception o f the
Eastern (Greek) Church Concerning the Transubstantiation o f the Body o f the Lord and other
Controversies. Baddeley, 206.
128 Ibid.
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only eighteen,^29 he returned to Moldavia to work for the court. During the next eight
years, Spafarii worked for several princes, including George S t e p h a n ( u n t i l his
banishme it in 1658 for attempting to seize the throne) and George Ghica. During the two
years Spafarii assisted Ghica, he was assigned as the commander o f the cavalry. During
this fateful appointment, Spafarii was entrusted with a thousand men and sent to settle
several local quarrels between rival regions in Transylvania. His successfi.il campaign
resulted in his adoption o f the name Spafarii, a military title referring to a horseman or
sword-bearer. *31
Following this successful military appointment, Spafarii became George Ghica’s
personal secretary, and then carried on his duties for his son Gregory. Between the years
1664 and 1668, Spafarii traveled to Brandenburg and accepted a position with Frederick
Wilhelm, the Kurfurst o f Brandenburg. 132 \ few satisfying years later, Spafarii departed
to rejoin George Stephan, his first employer, and to accept a respected position as
Stephan’s official diplomatic representative throughout Europe. The untimely death o f
Stephen in 1669 left Spafarii again searching for employment. 133
The opening at Moscow in 1671 for an educated religious man was tailor-made for
Spafarii. After receiving a recommendation from the church at Constantinople, Spafarii129*

129 Or twenty-eight, depending upon the correctness of Spafarii’s birth date.
DO Mancall indicates his name was Stefan Georgits. Mancall, 324.
D 1 The name itself is derived from his official title Spatharios, a word meaning sword bearer and applied
to the bodyguard of the Danubian Hospodars. Baddcley, 205.
D 2 jyue (o contradictions in his biographical information, the exact date is unknown. Mancall, 324.
D 3 Baddcley, 206.
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was accepted by the Posolski Prikaz, or foreign office. In Moscow, Spafarii’s linguistical
abilities shone. Despite arriving with no understanding o f Russian, Spafarii was soon
elevated to the position o f First Interpreter to the Posolski Prikaz o f die Moscow
Razriad.

This position, which had never before been granted to a foreigner,

acknowledged Spafarii’s remarkable expertise in Greek, Latin, and several other
languages. In addition, Spafarii was also the youngest interpreter ever employed by the
Prikaz. Spafarii’s natural abilities were astounding. As a reward for his excellence during
his initial employment, the grateful office granted Spafarii a lifetime appointment o f 100
rubles the day he was officially appointed to the department, December 14th, 1671. ^ 5
Along with Spafarii’s linguistic ability, educational qualifications and extensive
political experience, Spafarii also possessed an esoteric, ethereal quality that made him
especially well-suited to represent the Tsar on this important mission. Throughout
Spafarii’s unusual political career, his mannerisms and bearing were often remarked upon
by the surrounding officials. For example, French ambassador extraordinary, Amauld de
Pomponne (the nephew of the celebrated port royalist), mentioned Spafarii favorably after
meeting him in Stockholm. He exhalted Spafarii with noble titles including “Seigneur,
moldave baron and gentilhom m e."^^ Spafarii’s unusual demeanor was a unique
combination o f brash assurance and noble mannerisms that immediately impressed all who 1345*

134 Ibid., 207.
135 Mancall, 73.
l 3^ Baddeley, 205.
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viewed him. His educated speech provided an aura of knowledge and his self-assurance
quickly allowed Spafarii to control the flow o f conversation. These factors, embellished
with the immaculate dress and impeccable refinement o f the aristocracy, projected the
impression o f elegance and regal bearing.

These three qualities—education, experience

and posture, made Spafarii an excellent choice to represent the Russian tsar in China.
Like all humans, this skillful and ingenious scholar hid several character flaws that
stained the brilliance o f his accomplishments. An opportunist, Spafarii eagerly grasped
every occasion to advance his own career. Unfortunr.Hy, he cared little for those around
him. He routinely betrayed his friends, attempted to overthrow local governments, and
lied whenever it was necessary to elevate his success, position, or political standing.
Evidence even exists that Spafarii was a plagiarist and copied some o f his best known
works, including the world-renowned Rumanian bible, from other scholars. ^ 7 Qne
particular work, Spafarii’? Atlas of China, proves conclusively Spafarii’s tendency to
plagiarize. Included with a sheaf o f documents that chronicled his China mission,
Spafarii’s atlas was a conspicuously informative document. It gave detailed accounts o f
the southern Chinese terrain (a region Spafarii never visited) and the inner working o f the
Chinese government. In fact, Spafarii’s atlas was nearly a word for word copy o f a 1655
document o f the same name. This early summary, written by a Jesuit priest named Jesuit
Martini, was simply translated into Russian by Spafarii and claimed as his own work. 138*138

137 Ibid.
138 Spafarii, “Description of China,” in Baddcley, 209-11.
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Unfortunately, Spafarii was not simply a plagiarist. Behind the impressive
education and political reputation, Spafarii concealed a darker, depraved ambition that
often resulted in duplicity. During Spafarii’s earliest political years, his criminal activities
were limited to untraceable clandestine operations. Although no evidence exists,
Spafarii’s uncanny ability to maintain his high governmental position when first Stephan,
then Ghika, were removed from authority in the Moldavian leadership, smacks o f
conspiracy. 1^9 This insinuation receives a great deal o f strength in light o f Spafarii’s
efforts to depose his third employer, Stephaitz. 140
Initially Spafarii was employed as Stepanitz’s private secretary. However, after a
short time, it quickly became apparent their relationship would be one o f deep trust and
friendship. Stepanitz was a kind master and held Spafarii’s thoughts and opinions in high
esteem. He continuously consulted Spafarii on matters o f state and personal difficulties.
Spafarii was regularly invited dine at Stephanitz’s table and spent a considerable number
o f evenings in the prince's company drinking and playing cards. It was clear that Spafarii
was a valued and trusted member o f Stepanitz’s household. 141
Spafarii, however, was displeased with his subservient role. He gradually grew
tired o f Stepanitz and organized a movement to overthrow the kindly ruler. In his search139*4

139 [f Spafarii was able to play an active role in the disposition o f Stephen, he must have o f been
extremely cunning and clever to completely cover his tracks. Later he goes to rejoin Stephen and resumes
a close relationship. It is questionable how Spafarii could maintain a excellent working relationship with
the Ghikas while he was so friendly with Stephen. Baddclcy, 205-06.
140 Mancall refers to Stcphaitz as Prince Ilias Alcxandru. Mancall, 72.
141 Baddclcy, 206.
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for support, Spafarii sent letters, disguised in hollow sticks, to his friends in neighboring
areas. One o f these letters was intercepted by a loyal Besarabian administrator who
immediately returned the damning document to Stephanitz’s hands. **42 There was no
question o f Spafarii’s intent. His entire treasonist plan was outlined in his dispatch.
Angrily, Stephanitz sent for the executioner, but relented at the last minute, canceling
Spafarii’s death sentence. Instead, Stephanitz instructed that Spafarii was to be disfigured.
His nose was to be cut off to forever mark him as an untrustworthy traiior. *43
Fortunately for “chicken nose,” as Spafarii became known, his former employers
still looked favorably upon him. Immediately following his disfigurement, Spafarii found
refuge with Gregory Ghika in Wullachia, who employed him as an agent in Constantinople
during his initial recovery period. This kindness was cruelly repaided. During the turmoil
created by the war between the pope and Poland, Spafarii betrayed Ghioa’s trust. By
willingly following the d'abolica! instructions o f Shcherbak Xantakuzan, an ambitious
schemer who eyed Ghica’s position, Spafarii became an instrumental player in Ghica’s
displacement. With Ghika eliminated, Spafarii hoped to receive his reward from
Kantakuzan. But he failed to receive the vacated position. As a result Spafarii was left
without a job, patron or recommendation. *44

142 Ibid.
143Mancall. 72.
*44 Baddclcy, 206.
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Another member of the nobility, Frederick Wilhelm, Kurfiirst o f Brandenburg,
heard o f Spaf'arii’s credentials and offered to sponsor the intellectual. Under Wilhelm’s
watchful eye, Spafarii devoted himself to his studies and completed the Rumanian
translation o f the bible. He also underwent an unusual and experimental procedure to heal
his disfigured face. German doctors removed quantities of blood and flesh from his cheek
(presumably his rear cheek) and grafted the matter onto Spafarii’s injured nose. Spafarii
seemed content to remain for a time—at least until his nose became fully healed—before
deserting Wilhelm’s generous service. ^
Next Spafarii traveled to Stettin to work as Stephan’s diplomatic agent to
Stockholm. Here, he delivered his brilliant response to Calvin which redeemed his name
and revived his sagging career prospects. It was simple bad luck that Stephan died in
1669. With few options left, Spafarii traveled to his home in Moldavia, and then to
Wallachia before appearing in Constantinople before the patriarch.
For the Orthodox church, Spafarii must have presented a dilemma. On one hand
the man was brilliant scholar, and a stout defender o f the faith. On the other, he was an
embarrassment. Caught several times undermining his employers and too untrustworthy
to be tasked with mediating church business, Spafarii was too controversial to be absorbed
into the church administration. The Russian request for a learned orthodox man was
clearly the church’s best solution to rid itself o f Spafarii. The relatively isolated Russians
would have heard little o f Spafarii’s exploits and the man was superbly qualified to fill this145

145 Ibid.
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distant position. The church wholeheartedly recommended Spafarii to the Russian
government and illustrated his linguistical and educational merits in a glowing
reference. 146
It seemed that in Russia Spafarii finally found the life he so desperately sought. In
M oscow he was highly respected because o f his exceptional education. Immediately, his
work was brought to the attention o f the Tsar, and as the single most productive member
o f the Prikaz, Spafarii received an increase in salary to 132 rubles. In a few short months,
Spafarii was entrusted with translating all o f Russian’s secret correspondence. 147 In
1673, Spafarii’s ecclesiastic experience put him in high regard. He was assigned to
assume responsibility for the manuscripts and library o f Greek Bishop Paissios Ligarides,
who had recently fallen out o f favor. Additionally, Spafarii translated for many o f the
official embassies, including during the Danish visit in 1674.148 ft seemed that his
immediate cultivation o f important and powerful friends, the Russians’ appreciation o f his
linguistic skills, and their ability to trust him with important documents and diplomatic
assignments stroked Spafarii’s ego and encouraged him to fully embrace Russia as an
adopted home.14678

146 Ibid.

147 Man.. :i, 74.
148 Ibid.
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Having chosen an ambassador, Russian officials turned their attention to the
development o f the mission’s instructions. Tailored to compensate for Spafarii’s
shortcomings, the instructions were designed to be primarily a reference document. The
document explained in amazing detail the ambassador's tasks, Russia’s goals, and even
attempted to anticipate the content of the upcoming meeting with the Emperor. It even
provided properly worded speeches o f greeting, and described proper etiquette while
trying to anticipate difficulties and provide solutions for them to ease the negotiations. The
instructions were, in fact, too complete. In the course o f protecting Russian dignity and
honor, the instructions removed the flexibility, judgment, and creativity o f the Russian
ambassador.
From the onset, the instructions written by the Posolskii Prikaz provided the basic
structure o f the mission. From men to supplies and gifts, this office decided the proper
foundation necessary to make the mission a success. The Prikaz assigned two natives,
Fedor Pavlov and Konstiatin Grechanin, to act as guides. Two writers, Nikifor Veniukov
and Ivan Favorov, were assigned to remove the drudgery o f daily records from the
ambassador. 149 Jan Han, one of Moscow preemir.ate physicians and alchemist, was
selected to discover new medicines and procedures used in the distant empire. One
hundred twelve men were chosen in this way and fully outfitted with the stoutest pack
mules, horses and camels Moscow could procure. 15014950

149 Chin, 63.
150 “February 28, 1675 Instructions from the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii (Milescu) for
his embassy to the Chinese Empire” in Dmytryshyn, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia. 398.
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The Prikaz also prepared an enormous pile o f goods to be taken to China as trade
goods and gifts. Fifteen hundred rubles o f sable pelts were provided to exchange for a
sampling o f Chinese wares. A large number o f goods, strings o f pearls, sables, ermine,
amber and other Russian wares were provided to be presented to the Chinese emperor as
gifts o f goodwill and friendship. The Prikaz even included an additional two hundred
rubles o f sable pelts and twenty pods of tobacco to be freely given the Chinese people at
large in the Tsar’s name. 1^ 1
With the general logistics o f the mission decided, the Prikaz officials turned their
attention to formulating a comprehensive document for Spafarii’s use. By attempting to
foresee the pace, tempo, and direction o f the upcoming negotiations, they provided
Spafarii with the script and procedures he was to follow to achieve that vision. The
officials recorded that upon reaching the first Chinese village, Spafarii was to seek out the
officials or administrator and inform the man that he represents “the Great Sovereign Tsar
and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat o f all Great, Little and White Russia,
Heir through Father and Grandfather, and Lord and master o f many realms and lands in
the East, West and North.” ^ 2 After relaying that his expedition was to discuss affairs c f
state with the Emperor, the town official was then required to immediately provide an
escort, food, transportation and guides to assist his journey to Peking.152

151 Ibid., 399.

152 ibid.
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As Spafarii traveled further into China, he was instructed to travel quickly, making
inquires on the state o f Chinese politics. He should discover if other countries send
ambassadors to China and note the reply. He was also to inquire about the customary
procedures performed by ambassadors, and determine if personal audiences with the
Emperor were commonplace or if official credentials were normally delivered in person.
Above all Spafarii was to ensure that he was granted the same procedures as visiting
ambassadors from other countries. '^3
Upon reaching the capital city, Spafarii’s first duty was to present his letter o f
credence to the Emperor. Naturally, the Russian officials preferred that he pr*, „ent it
without the representatives o f other countries b . ng present, but if that could not be
arranged he was to visit the Emperor’s residence and ow before him on behalf o f the
great sovereign. Then he was to greet the Emperor using a carefully worded speech the
Prikaz officials had prepared.
By the Grace o f God, the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei
Mikhailovich, Autocrat o f all Great, Little, and White Russia, Tsar o f
Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir and Novgorod, Tsar o f Kazan, Tsar o f Astrakhan,
Tsar of Siberia, Sovereign of Pskov, Grand Prince o f Smolensk, Tver,
Iugra, Perm, Viatka, Bulgaria and Sovereign o f others, Grand Prince o f
Nizhnii Novgorod, Chernigov, Riazan, Rostov, Iaroslav, Beloozero,
Udorsk, Obdorsk, Kondinsk, Master o f all northern lands, Sovereign o f the
Iversk lands o f the Kartalin and Gruzin Tsars, Sovereign o f the Kabardinsk
lands o f the Cherkass and mountain princes, Heir through Father and
Grandfather and Lord and Master o f many other realms and lands in the
East, West and North, has commanded me to bow to you, Greatly
Esteemed Bugdykhan, Master o f the city o f Kanbalyk and o f the entire 153

153 Ibid., 400.
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Chinese Empire, and he has commanded me to inform you o f His Tsarist
Majesty’s health, and to inquire about your health, the Khan. 154

Spafarii was to supplement this introductory speech with the Emperor’s proper titles and
official names. He was to have discovered them prior to his audience. When the Emperor
responded to Spafani’s inquiry and asked after the Tsar’s well-being Spafarii was to recite
the following carefully worded passage.

When we left our Great Sovereign, His Tsarest Majesty, by the grace o f
God, our Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich,
Autocrat o f all Great, Little and White Russia, and Heir through Father and
Grandfather and Lord and Master o f many realms and lands, East, West
and North, was in good health, thanks to God’s Grace, and was reigning
over his great and illustrious lands o f the great and renowned Russian
Tsardom. 155

Following this brief exchange, Spafarii would present his letter indicating his
authority to represent Russia. Spafarii would actually carry six letters to the Chinese
empire. Three documents in Russian, Latin and Turkish proclaimed that the ambassador
was a full ambassador and endowed with the full authority o f the Tsar. The seconf set o f
three documents proclaimed him as a simple envoy. If received directly by the Chi ise
Emperor, Spafarii was instructed to present the letter proclaiming him ambassador in the154

154 Ibid.
155 Ibid., 401.
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Russian language. During a second lengthy speech that reiterated the Tsar’s lofty position
and expounded on his virtues of foresight, Spafarii was to present and explain that he had
brought duplicates o f his ciocumentation in Latin and Turkish to assist the Em peror’s
officials in translating the Tsar’s communication. The ambassador’s final duty after the
letter was duly presented and translated was to present the Tsar’s gifts. They were to be
delivered to the Emperor “with due observation o f ceremony” and accompanied by yet
another prewritten speech. 156
The Russian instructions were, however, geared toward the perfect encounter with
the Chinese. If China responded as anticipated, this carefully planned scene ensured
positive and friendly relations would sprout from this most auspicious and favorable o f
beginnings. But the Russian officials were not completely idealistic. They understood that
the likelihood o f the ambassadorial mission occurring as their utopian view projected was
extremely unlikely. A contingency plan was prepared to address the difficulties Russian
representatives had encountered in the past. First, the Russian officials felt that the
Emperor would refuse to receive the ambassador’s letter in person. He would probably
insist on carrying out official business through his government councilors. In such an
event, Spafarii was instructed to inform the Chinese officials that he emphatically refused
to deliver either the Tsar’s letter or the royal gifts to anyone but the Em peror.156157

156 Ibid., 401-02.
157 Ibid., 402.
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After ensuring that the Emperor would be informed o f his protests, Spafarii was to
stress that the persona of the Tsar would be offended if his letter and gifts were not
accepted by the Emperor’s own hand. He was to clearly explain that all civilized countries
maintained this practice and that Chinese envoys wou'u receive similar honors when they
journeyed to Russia. Spafarii v/as to continue this argument until

her an honorable

compromise that would not jeopardize the dignity and honor o f the Tsar was reached or
Spauuii s mission was in serious jeopardy.
In the event that Spafar:;’s efforts to adhere to European custom threatened the
mission’s success, Spafarii was instructed to tactfully retract his protests. He was
instructed to relate that
he has been sent from the Great Sovereign, His Tsarest Majesty, to their
sovereign Bugdykhan with His Tsarest Majesty’s gramota [letter] o f amity
for the purpose o f discussing matters urgent and vital to both sovereigns
and that he must obey the will and instructions o f his own sovereign, His
Tsarist Majesty, but that in this matter he will conduct himself in
accordance with the will o f Bugdykhan, and whatever he decrees will be
done. 159

After making this announcement, Spafarii was instructed to work closely with the
Chinese officials. He was to present them the three letters that indicated his envoy status,
explaining that the language difference would assist them in making a Chinese
translation. 160 Spafarii was also allowed to deliver his gifts to these officials (if 158960

158 Ibid., 402-03.
159 Ibid., 403.
160 Ibid., 403-04.
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specifically requested to do so), but he should protest venomously and reiterate that this
action was not in accordance with his mission’s friendship and goodwill. Warned not to
bow or discuss any o f his ambassadorial business with the Emperor’s councilors, Spafarii
was permitted to address the business that was considered below the Em peror’s station.
These tasks primarily consisted o f translating four letters that Russia had received during
the last century and establishing official forms of reference between the two empires. 1^1
Spafarii carried four documents to China. The first two predated the manchu
dynasty while the last two were the remnants of the Baikov mission and the Chinese
communication o f 1670.162 The Tsar, unfamiliar with Chinese and Manchu, desired the
letters to be translated into a readily understood language, preferably Latin, and returned
to M oscow for analysis and deliberation. Spafarii was to request an explanation o f the
documents’ contents and ascertain what actions the Emperor wished the Tsar to consider.
The Prikaz officials recognized that several issues in the documents must refer to highly
sensitive events, but they allowed Spafarii to respond, if circumstances allowed, on all
controversial topics as long as he insured that there would be no injury to the name,
honor, and dignity o f the Tsar (or loss to his treasury). *63
Spafarii was also instructed to attempt to translate these documents privately,
without the Chinese officials’ assistance. If he succeeded, he was to request that the

161 Ibid., 404.
162 § ee chapter two for text of the letters from the 1618 mission and (he 1649 communication collected
during the mission to the Atlin Khan. Ibid. Chin. 68.
163 Ibid.
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Chinese officials translate the documents while he was present, to ensure that they were
not altered. The letters were also to be corrected, and all phrases that contained
derogatory statements or utilized the Tsar’s titles erroneously were to be corrected. ^
Finally, after resolving the letter issue, Spafarii was to address the mechanics o f
future communication. He was to suggest the declaration o f an official communication
language that both side could readily understand. The Prikaz officials indicated that they
preferred either Latin or Turkish, and suggested that one o f these widely known languages
by used as the basis for future communications. They also provided a list o f the Tsar’s
official titles for use in future correspondence to alleviate uncertainty and confusion.
Spafarii was to request the same from the Chinese officials and carefully examine it to
ensure that the Emperor did not claim titles that were owned by the rulers o f other
neighboring countries. *65
Spafarii was also assigned an enormous list o f minor tasks which included
determining other more traversable routes between the two empires, compiling a list o f
Chinese goods available for Russian trade and numerous other small details related to the
cost and requirements of establishing a caravan route. ^6 6

these issue were o f

importance only in the instance o f a successful meeting. The Prikaz officials assumed that
regardless o f the intensity o f the early disagreements over protocol, Spafarii’s retraction o f

164 Ibid., 404-05
165 Ibid., 4C5.

166 Ibid., 407.
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his position and willingness to accept the Emperor’s customs would eliminate all forms of
tension from the negotiation. They did not consider that one ramification o f this strategy
might be that Spafarii would seem discourteous and presumptuous and that his retraction,
no matter how humbly it was presented, would alter the first impression that Spafarii’s
intractability created. Instead, Russian officials seemed to assume that once Spafarii
agreed to work within the confines o f Chinese customs, the incident would be forgotten
and Spafarii would continue his negotiations unhampered by ill-feeling.
A second and more vital issue, the Amur basin dispute, would also create
numerous difficulties for Spafarii. Completely ignored by the Prikaz officials, The Amur
basin issue was a sensitive Chinese concern, but Spafarii’s instructions made only a single
reference to the explosive topic. He was instructed to attempt to negotiate for the release
or exchange o f any Russian prisoners that the Chinese were currently holding. 167 It is
tempting to suggest that Russia was unaware o f the Chinese interest in settling the Amur
basin dispute due to their inability to translate Chinese communications on the subject, but
this assumption is undoubtedly false. The Russian government was clearly aware o f the
Chinese concern over the Amur basin. As early as 1654, during the Baikov mission,
Aleksei Mikhailovich demonstrated his understanding o f the Amur basin problem. When
Baikov failed to return promptly from his assignment in China, the Tsar feared that he may

Spafarii was expected to negotiate a set po'icy on release of prisoners held within the Chinese empire.
He was to request that the Chinese empire should release all Russian prisoners held within the Chinese
emphe without charging ransom and that the Russian government would do the same and ensure they
would not be harassed in their journey homeward. Spafarii was, however, authorized to negotiate with the
Chinese and pay a ransom of up to thirty rubles a piece if the Chinese government demanded payment.
Ibid., 405-06.
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have been taken prisoner as retribution for the continuing violence in the Amur. With
AHin’s assistance a document was hastily drafted to address the situation. But before the
letter could depart Moscow, news o f Baikov’s safe return to Russian territory preempted
the letter’s d ispatchers
In 16 70, Russia was again made aware o f China’s concerns. The letter delivered
to Nerchinsk by an armed group o f Chinese soldiers attested to the fact that China was
still keenly h t crested in halting the violence and atrocities committed on the Amur.
Spafarii’s interception o f the 1670 Chinese dispatch at Toposk certainly was accompanied
by an account o f how it arrived at the Russian border station, but Spafarii fails to mention
the significance of the document in his letter to the Tsar.

This indicates that the Tsar

either already was aware o f the letter’s contents from an earlier message posted from
Nerchinsk or the information Spafarii gathered did not alter his briefing regarding the
conflict. 170
Perhaps the reason the issue remains unaddressed in Spafarii’s instructions is that
Russia was incapable o f controlling the Amur basin. The violent zeal with which the
natives were ruthlessly controlled ensured maximum profits from the region and both *•

168 Chin, 56.
169 The letter arrived with sixty armed Chinese who remained until the letter’s significance and contents
were explained in full to Arshinsky. Spafarii docs not even mention the prominent topic the letter
addresses in his explanation to the Tsar. Ibid., 61. Spafarii, “Spathary’s Letter to the Tsar, dated 15th
April 1675,” in Baddeley, 244.
•70 Moscow knew of the letter’s existence before Spafarii was sent to China. Spafarii had been instructed
to have four letters translated by the Chinese, not three. Spafarii certainly must have received at least an
oral briefing regarding the Amur basin. If he had not, this letter, which directly impacted the scope and
direction of his mission, would have required further instruction from Moscow.
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Russia and their authorities were unmotivated to enforce restrictions. The frontier
Voevodas lacked sufficient forces and the inclination to demand the end o f excessive
exploitation. In addition, the region was inhabited by Cossack hunters and explorers who
were nearly lawless and they barely tolerated the few restrictions the Tsar had placed on
their freedom. Finally, none o f the frontier dwellers would volui..arily give up their
profitable and enjoyable lifestyle. Without the ability or inclination to solve the Amur
issue, Russia chose to ignore it. Spafarii was instructed to claim that the Em peror’s letters
could not be translated and since the contents were unknown, Spafarii could not be
expected to negotiate a settlement. 171
Finally, the instructions themselves would present difficulties for Spafarii. The
rigidly explained procedures and traditional Russian political procedures itemized in the
document would be nearly impossible to obtain in the ancient Chinese culture. To make
matters worse, Spafarii would interpret the document literally, ignoring the intention o f
the Russian officials to establish trade and friendly relations. His decision to adhere to the
tenets o f the instructions, ignoring the clause that allowed him to deviate from the
document if his mission were threatened, assured conflict and limited his effectiveness as a
negotiator.

171 “February 28, 1675 Instructions from the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii (Milcscu) for
his embassy to the Chinese Empire,” in Cmytryshyn, 404. This is an idiotic strategy. The Chinese
instmeted that the letter be fully translated upon delivery and since the Milovanov letter was sent in reply,
Russia obviously understood the Chinese complaint. Nonetheless, the Russians hoped that by stalling this
issue they could establish a trade treaty before the Chinese discovered Russia’s lack o f control in the
Amur.
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Spafarii’s mission was destined to travel the path o f conflict Hampered by a
limited interpretation o f his instructions, lack of information about key issues, and plagued
by miscommunication and cultural discourse, Spafarii’s mission was exceptionally difficult
to complete. But the most difficult factor, Spafarii’s argumentative and insulting
approach, would prove to be the most damaging factor to the mission’s success.

CHAPTER 4: SPAFARII IN ACTION

Spafarii’s journey began on March 3rd, 1675.' 22 Departing from Moscow with
his instructions, an impressive array of gifts, and an exorbitant number o f guards, guides,
translators, and advisors, Spafarii began to traverse the forty-seven hundred miles o f
wilderness to Peking. The majority o f this vast distance was extremely tedious, especially
travel through the Urals, and the flat plains o f Siberia, but Spafarii used the time wisely.
He mulled over the political situation, carefully examining previous Russian encounters
with the Chinese and read accounts o f European political experiences. *23 Although
Spafarii contacted Moscow frequently, his letters and reports expressed only the hope o f a
successful mission and vague rumors gathered from the local population.
At Tobolsk, 1150 miles east o f Moscow, Spafarii’s mission gradually began to
gain velocity. He decided to abandon the poorly developed frontier roads in favor o f river
travel. Spafarii choose to travel along the Irtish river, then the Ob, the Yeneseisk, and
finally the Selenga, near Lake Baikal. His decision to use water as his primary means o f
transportation would save his men months o f bone-aching hours on horseback and quite

'2 2 The story of Spafarii’s journey to China is contained in Nikolai Gavrilovich Milescu Spafarii
“Statenii spisok posolstva N. Spafariia v Kitai,” and is the primary document for this chapter.
Clarification o f events and translations were taken from John. F. Baddclcy’s which translated two
chapters from the original work and sections of Spafarii’s Description of China.
'23 Spafarii, “Descriptions of China,” in Baddclcly, 245.
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possibly place his mission ahead of schedule. ^74 w ith the route chosen, Spafarii began
to fill out his retinue. He selected six boyar sons, as allowed by his instructions, to
accompany him. Six falconers along with their assistants were chosen to care for the
Russian hunting falcons that would be presented as gifts to the Chinese emperor. *75
Fina'ly, Spafarii designated several native guides, fluent in local dialects, to assist him in
gathering rumors and information along the route. The natives, hunters and traders o f the
frontier regions would be better ina rmed than the Russian government and Spafarii
desired a realistic and current image o f the Manchu dynasty.
Spafarii’s reconnaissance information provided a wealth o f accurate and useful
data. However, since much o f the information was hearsay or biased, Spafarii found it
extremely difficult to form an accurate image o f the Chinese situation. For example, one
o f his men, a dragonman, war ■ifted enough to speak both Chinese and Nikan. He
informed Spafarii that the local Nikantsi tribe members claimed that the Manchu habitually
lied. They explained that the Nikantsi were not willing members o f the Manchu empire
but had been conquered and were slaves. ^76 j w0 disastrous battles with the Manchu had

*74 The actual route Spafarii would use was left undecided until he reached Tobolsk. His instructions
stated that “Nikolai is to travel from Moscow to the Siberian town of Tobolsk, and from Tobolsk to the
Chinese Empire through the Kalmyk uluses, having ascertained carefully which route are the most direct
and the most suitable.” In addition, Spafarii was entrusted to flesh out his entourage at Tobolsk. This
was due to practical considerations. Since the official route had not yet been chosen and native speakers
and guides for the area were scarce in Moscow, Spafarii was allowed to select several additions to his
entourage. “February 28, 1675 Instructions from the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii
(Milescu) for his embassy to the Chinese Empire,” in Dmytryshyn, 399.
17^ The falcons were sent as a response to a request of a Chinese lord, Ochurta who requested two
Russian falcons. Spafarii choose eleven white birds and eight red for the journey. Spafarii, “Spafarii’s
Letter to the Tsar, dated 15th April, 1675,” in Baddelcy, 245.
*7^ Spafarii, “Description of China,” in Baddelcy, 226.
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shattered their people and resulted in widespread slavery. The Nikantsi also reported that
only women and children remained in Peking. Aii me men had disappeared, and were
fighting dissenters elsewhere in the empire. Based upon the Nikantsi complaints, Spafarii
was unable to trust the information these men provided. In his official report, he indicated
“God knows whom to believe, until He brings us to the capital.” ^ ”7
Although Spafarii seemed to be carefully weighing his reconnaissance information,
the rumors and stories he gathered in Siberia and the Far East colored his judgment and
biased his opinion o f the Chinese. During the weeks that followed, Spafarii would write in
his journal that the Chinese are “desperately greedy, no better than Turks”. 178 He is
convinced that the Chinese are poor, weak individuals who are easily cowed and subdued.
He states that “when I reach the frontier I shall see what sort o f country it is, and what
population and armaments they have—the latter I hear very poor.” 179 jn this same letter,
Spafarii recorded that the Chinese emperor had fled to Dahuria in terror, and that the
present would be a favorable time
to gain honor, for they and the Chinese Tatar are the worst o f people and
not warlike. And the Mongols are mightily afraid o f the Cossacks. And I
seem to see if providence but wills it, the fear o f God (and of) the great
Tsar fall upon the heathen o f these countries so that they shall flee when no
man p u r s u e th .^ *

177 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddeley, 290.
178 Ibid.
*79 Spafarii, “Letter to MayvcycITfrom Yenscisk,” in Baddeley, 259.
l 8^ Ibid.
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As the available information grew so did Spafarii’s confidence. Natives and
Cossacks alike informed Spafarii that a major revolt was underway within China. In early
July, 1675, Spafarii learned that several bands of rebellious Ming had successfully rallied
against the Manchu and that the Manchu had failed to subdue the rebels not once but
several times. 181 Spafarii informed Matveyev on July 12th, that “the old Chinese have
been gathering strength and beaten the Emperor’s tartars several times.” He also indicated
that it was clear “the old Chinese will prevail as they have done in the past.” 182
From Yeneseisk on July 18th, Spafarii wrote a letter to inform the Tsar o f China’s
precarious position. He reported that groups o f Cossack traders were held at Kalgin for
three weeks while the Manchu searched for armed troops. Trade in the region had been
exceptionally poor with little profit. 183 The reason, Spafarii concluded,' ;as open war
with the Nikansh kingdom (the old Chinese Ming supporters). Spafarii had heard that
there had been two major battles utilizing forty thousand men. The Manchu had lost both
o f these enormous conflicts and searched for more troops to strengthen their sagging
armies. 184 With the Manchu fully occupied, Spafarii estimated that only two thousand
troops would be required to conquer the Dahur territory, the Amur region, and southward
up to the Chinese wall. Spafarii stressed that now was the time to strike because the *18234
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183 Spafarii, “Letter to the Tsar, From Yeneseisk, July 18th,” in Baddclcy, 257.
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“Emperor being at present extremely weak, was mightily afraid o f the Cossacks and
greatly upset by the war with the Nikansh.” ^ ^
On the thirteenth o f January, 1676, Spafarii reached the Chinese frontier, thrilled
and elated at his mission’s progress.

Despite the narshness o f the Siberian winter,

Spafarii and his men had traveled safely to the Chinese border and were well ahead o f
schedule. The long, difficult trip from Moscow had been accomplished in only nine
months and the entourage was nearly intact. A few men had deserted, but despite the
hardship and length o f the mission, the majority were eager and willing to continue
traveling on to Peking. Unfortunately, the rapid pace set so far on the journey was not
sustainable. The difficulty of protracted winter travel showed plainly on the faces o f
Spafarii’s men. Thin and exhausted, the men could not continue without a lengthy rest.
The pack animals fared even worst. Spafarii’s prolonged march had killed many o f the
mimals and the remaining beasts were overburdened and overtaxed. I 87 But Spafarii did
not regret his decision. He had reached China four months ahead o f schedule!!
As Spafarii and his men passed over the summit o f the Targachin mountain chain
that marked the Russian-Chinese border, they were greeted by a large group o f heavily
armed Chinese. Sixty o f the stout men confronting them were clearly Chinese troops sent
to protect the border from invading enemies. However, off to one side stood a smaller*187

1^5 ibid.
186spafarii, “Description o f Dalai{-nor} and the River Argun,” in Baddclcy, 283-84.
187 Ibid., 282.
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group o f eight men, one clearly a Cossack from his dress. The Cossack was one of
Spafarii’s own men, Milovanov, sent forward several months ago to announce Spafarii’s
imminent arrival. The other seven were Kargachln Sotniks, minor Chinese officials. *^8
Upon recognizing Milovanov, Spafarii boldly stepped forward and impatiently gestured
for Milovanov to translate the Sotniks’ speech.
The Sotniks’ announcement was distressing. They explained that they were
unprepared for Spafarii’s arrival. Since he had not been expected for several more months,
they were unable to equip his entourage immediately. Milovanov, the Sotniks explained,
had arrived by the Albazin road and informed them that Spafarii would not arrive until
spring. Naturally, knowing this information, the Sotniks logically believed that this large
group, arriving by the Nerchinsk road and nearly four months before Spafarii’s expected
arrival, simply could not be the Russian ambassador and was most likely a hostile invasion
force. In apology, they promised Spafarii’s delay would be short and sufficient horses,
oxen and carts would arrive during the next few days to fully equip Spafarii’s large and
unwieldy entourage.1
Spafarii consoled himself during the unexpected delay by reexamining the
promising future o f his political mission. During his travels, Spafarii had learned from
Cossacks and Amur natives that China was having serious internal difficulties.

An189

*88 Karagachin Sotniks are actually Torgachin border officials. Spafarii mistakenly called the nomadic
people living in the outskirts of the Chinese empire Karagachin. Nikolai Gavrilovich Milcscu Spafarii,
“Spafarii’s Letter to the Tsar of April 17th, 1676 taken from the Naun Villages by MilovanofT,” in
“Statenii spisok,” 172.
189 Ibid.
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extensive military operation was in progress near the southern border. Rebellious
supporters of the Ming dynasty, who were overthrown in 1644, had not yet been
completely suppressed by the Manchu and a full-scale confrontation was underway.
Spafarh was certain that with such a draw on the economy, China would surely welcome
prospective traders from Russia and do so on Russia’s terms. Spafarii anticipated the
coming egotiations would be simple leaving him rich and well-regarded in Russia
because o f the lavish and huge concessions he would extract from China for the pleasure
o f trading with the mighty Russian empire.
Unfortunately, from the first day on Chinese territory Spafarii’s mission began to
diverge from this pleasant delusion. The few days the Sotniks requested to properly outfit
Spafarii’s ungainly entourage stretched into eight. The entire region was searched for
enough horses, oxen, and carts to properly transport the Russian visitor. One hundred ten
saddle horses and 246 carts, each with horses or a brace o f oxen, supplemented the weary
Russian riding and pack animals. ^ 0 five more days o f hard travel (until January twentythird) were required before reaching the first sizable Chinese settlement, Naun—a location
at which Spafarii would be delayed for three full months before continuing to Peking. *9*
The Chinese village o f Naun was named for the nearby river.

Although small, the

city boasted reasonable facilities for visitors and provided Spafarii and his men with a large

190 A large number of the camels Spafarii had brought as pack animals had died en route from lack of
food and exposure to the chilly climate. Spafarii, “Description of Dalai{-nor} and the River Argun,” in
Baddeley, 282.
191 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddeley, 287.
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clearing near the main village to establish camp. As Spafarii’s first official encounter with
the Chinese, he was granted the opportunity to carefully confirm the reconnaissance
information he had gathered along his route. But Spafarii failed to take this cautious step.
Instead o f examining the village’s political staicture and determining their role in overall
Chinese politics, Spafarii decided the village officials were beneath his notice. Adopting a
haughty air, Spafarii refused to respond to the questions o f the lesser village officials and
was barely civil to the village Voevoda. He responded contemptuously to the man’s
request for identification and ignored the official’s questions regarding the purpose o f his
visit. Finally, Spafarii pointedly exclaimed “the Tsar’s letters or your own sovereign’s
gifts and other affairs o f state, no one o f these things is any business o f y o u rs.” 192
Spafarii’s only effort to quell the population’s questions was to indicate the Tsar
was friendly and peaceful. When further questioned by the officials o f Naun for proof o f
Spafarii’s position, he flippantly replied “were I not authorized by Your Majesty, I should
not show so bold and confident a front, nor should I be accompanied by so many people
o f varying ranks and positions. 193
Spafarii steadfastly refused to present a single piece o f evidence confirming his
lofty position, and in return was categorically denied the customary honors o f food,
transportation, and lodging. The Naun officials insisted that proof o f Spafarii’s*

*92 Spafarii, “Spafarii’s Letter to the Tsar of April 17th, 1676 taken from the Naun Villages by
MilovanofT,” “Statcnii spisok,” 172-73.
193 Ibid., 174. This attitude and bniskness of speech is apparent throughout the journal whenever he is
speaking to the Chinese.
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ambassadorial status be rendered before Spafarii was provided with additional
resources.

When both sides refused to retreat, the Chinese tried a different tactic.

Approaching the problem diplomatically, the Naun officials explained that the Emperor
had instructed that all visitors must present their credentials before receiving
ambassadorial honors. They then tactfully reminded Spafarii o f the many miles remaining
between Naun and Peking, and stressed the numerous hardships and delays he would
experience without ambassadorial status. 195 Eventually, Spafarii reluctantly yielded to
this pressure, and cited in his official report the obstinate nature o f the Chinese population
and the fact that he would not be forwarded to Peking without yielding to the Chinese
request. *96
Perhaps most surprising was the fact that the Naun officials had no interest in
reading Spafarii’s official correspondence. When Spafarii finally produced the Em peror’s
letter, all the Chinese present fell immediately to their knees, bowing before the letter and
touching the document to their heads as a sacred object. Afterwards, Spafarii was
awarded full ambassadorial honors without another question. 197 Unfortunately, Spafarii
could not have foreseen this unusual Chinese reaction to the letter. He could not have
known that the mere sight of the document was sufficient to ensure the security o f his

194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid., 174-75.
197 Ibid., 175.
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mission. However, Spafarii also made no effort to understand the Chinese position and
clarify their requests for proof of his authority.
This bungling first impression created resentment and coolness from the I .urn
officials and they flatly assured him that they could do little for him to further his mission
to Peking. Instead, they informed Spafarii that an extremely important man o f high rank
was traveling hastily to Naun to escort him to the capital. Since this high official was
arranging food, lodging and additional transportation along the route, Spafarii could
expect no more difficulties or delays to obtain supplies or transportation. 198 since the
Naun officials could no longer assist him, Spafarii had no choice but to wait for the high
official to arrive.
As Spafarii waited, he was able to closely examine the everyday lives o f Naun’s
population. He recorded in his journal that they were much like the Turks. They even
celebrated hamina, “the celebrating, in the month o f March, according to the moon, as the
Turks... all their customs were Asiatic and Turkish—houses, food, drink, and clothes, all
but their hats—saving that they do not hide away their women.” *99 Spafarii made one
astute observation during this period that could have greatly assisted his mission. He
recorded that the Chinese “are humble in speech, simple in attire yet in that seeming
humility is concealed a vast pride, for they believe that there are no better people in the

198 Ibid.
199 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddclcy. 290.
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world than they and that their manners and customs are superior to those o f o th ers. ”200
Unfortunately, Spafarii failed to apply this observation to his negotiating approach. He
continued to assume that the Chinese were inferior and eventually they would be forced to
accept his position and requirements because of the internal difficulties the government
faced.
Because o f Spafarii’s insulting mannerisms, the Naun officials maintained their
distance from the Russian ambassador. They occasionally visited, but their visits were far
from friendly. They complained o f Albazin Cossacks and their demands for tribute on
Tungus natives, and hinted that Spafarii should present them with valuable presents as
when the Emperor sent his official correspondence tc 1 irchinsk. But Spafarii’s haughty
responses, continuous refusals to submit to the s nallest request, and lack o f understanding
and compassion for the position of the Naun officials resulted in his alienation. Few
individuals were willing to approach the Russian ambassador and as a result Spafarii lost
the opportunity to learn Chinese protocol and customs and test the Chinese interest in
establishing trade without the official repercussions that would result from a faux pas in
Peking.
Spafarii did make one useful connection during his initial stay in Naun. Through
liberal use o f presents, Spafarii enlisted the assistance o f an official secretary to translate
the 1670 Milovanov letter. Spafarii wrote to the Tsar that the letter’s primary request was
the return o f the Chinese traitor Gantimur and was troubling only in the sense that its’
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address lacked the Tsar’s full array o f tities. It had simply stated from “the Bogdikhan to
the White Tsar, greeting!”^ ’* Spafarii went on to explain the Gantimur ::sue in great
detail. He remarked that since Gantimur was the best o f all the tributary Tunguses, being
remarkably brave and leading a clan o f three hundred men, it was unwise to return the
man. Spafarii also insisted that Gantimur was opposed to being returned to China and
would commit suicide if the Tsar insisted that he be returned. 202 Spafarii’s analysis o f the
situation rationalized that the Chinese request was based on fear. He believed the Manchu
were concerned because o f the warlike nature o f the Tungus tribes and they anticipated
that since Gantimur and his clan lived very close to the frontier (at Nerchinsk) and because
Gantimur held intimate knowledge o f the region, he would persuade the Russian Cossacks
to attack the Chinese.^03
On February 26th, one full month after Spafarii’s arrival in Naun, the Chinese
representative arrived. Mala, or Askaniama, the official title used when addressing him,
was greeted with great ceremony at the Naun village. This powerfiil man held the position
o f Shin-Lang, one o f four vice presidents o f the 3rd board, Li Pu, which governed official

201 Ibid.
202 Spafarii had met with the man and assured him that he would never be returned to China. Ibid., 29091.
203 Fortunately for Spafarii and Russo-Chincsc relations, Spafarii’s entourage was not afflicted with
Spafarii’s bigotry and sense of superiority. They continuously talked to the native populations o f the land
they traveled through and gathered information. This included translating the letters Spafarii carried and
discovering the proper titles for the Emperor and other useful information on the land, people, trade
goods, and history of China. Ibid.

101

ceremonies.204 ft js doubtful that Spafarii recognized the influential position o f the
Askaniama.

In fact, in Opisanie Kitaiskavo Gosudararsiva, Spafarii defines M ala’s rank

as a lowly clerk and plainly views him as a minor character on the political stage. He
records that Askaniama is of the fourth rank o f Chinese nobleman '‘who attend in both
greater and lesser offices, one or two of them; and they in. those offices or Boards, are as
our Dumni Diaks inasmuch as the junior clerks write and the seniors correct after which
the work is revised by the diaks and dum nis.”205

Spafarii was warned o f Mala’s importance prior to his arrival. Several Naun
officials suggested that he should go out to greet this important mandarin. They informed
Spafarii that the Askaniama was one o f the Emperor’s nearest advisors and received all of
the Emperor’s orders directly.206 But Spafarii chose to ignore this advice and remained
within his residence while Mala entered Naun. He reasoned that in all other countries,
ambassadors, as representatives of kings, emperors and other omnipotent rulers, were
visited by lesser men. They were allowed to defer only to the ruler they had com • to see

^ M a y e r ’s Chinese Government indicates that there are a total of six boards from the following
categories Civil Office, revenue, war, punishment, works and ceremonies. Mala’s rank o f Askaniama was
one of four underlings that served the head of the board and thus held the power to influence the head of
the department. Mayer also indicates that in the Chinese hierarchy, Mala’s rank was equivalent to lower
second class-roughly equal to uie Russian Statski Sovietnik (state councilor). Ibid., ix.

205 Ibid.
206j would assume that the phrasing “received all of the Khan’s orders” indicate that Maia is privileged
with personal audiences with the Emperor and often reports directly to him without reporting to the head,
of the board of ceremonies. This suspicion is also supported by the appearance o f the Emperor’s private
assistant who visits Mala several times while he is visiting with Spafarii in Peking. Spafarii, “Statcnii
spisok,” 179.
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and not lowly government officials. Spafarii did, however, acknowledge Mala’s arrival.
He sent a messenger to Mala’s nearby compound to inquire o f the health o f the two boyarsons he had sent to Peking to announce his impending arrival. Mala graciously responded
to this request and reciprocated the ill-mannered gesture with his own messenger and
police inquiry o f Spafarii’s health and well being.207
Shortly following this brief exchange, two Naun officials called upon Spafarii in his
compound. The oldest o f the Naun officials (unnamed), and the youngest, Mangutei, had
brought further greetings from Mala. Mangutei, who had joined Spafarii in Nerchinsk,
had traveled to Peking with Milovanov and had recently returned with Mala from the
capital city, was well known by Spafarii and had been extremely helpful earlier in the
mission. These two men, on Mala’s behalf, requested that Spafarii visit Mala in his nearby
compound to exchange welcoming statements. Mangutei carefully explained that while
hastening to Naun to greet him, Maia had been thrown from his horse, seriously injuring
his leg, and was unable to w alk. 208
Spafarii distrusted this innocent sounding invitation and refused. He indicated that
he had witnessed Mala’s arrival and had personally noted that the official was incapable o f
walking. However, since Mala had arrived at Naun in a cart and the Chinese had a custom *2

207 Ibid., 179-80.
2^8 Actually he had fallen from his horse while chasing a hare during a rest break. Ibid.
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o f being carried in chairs, Spafarii indicated that Mala could easily be carried to his
compound for a visit. 209 Mala refused.
The next day, the two officials returned with another message from Mala. He
again requested that Spafarii come and visit him in his tent. The reason, Mala stressed,
was that he had been given strict orders not to visit the Russian ambassador. Therefore,
since several issues needed to be addressed before Spafarii could continue to Peking, the
Russian ambassador must come to the Chinese com pound.210 Spafarii again refused and
explained his rationale in great detail. Not only did such a suggestion breach established
European custom, but the act itself would heap dishonor upon the Tsar.211
Later that same day, the Naun officials returned to Spafarii to deliver a consoling
statement from Mala. Askaniama, they relayed, understood Spafarii’s position clearly for
he too faced the same difficulty. He could sympathize with Spafarii’s fear o f disobeying
his Tsar’s orders. Personally, he faced beheading if he disobeyed the Emperor.
Therefore, Mala proposed a reasonable solution that would not violate either
representative’s instructions. He suggested that they use his secretary as an intermediary.
M ala’s secretary could pose his questions and carefully record Spafarii’s responses for
later e x a m in a tio n a l 2 j n this manner, the difficult preliminary discussions could be
achieved. But Spafarii was not satisfied with this solution. He believed Askaniama had

209 Ibid., 180.
210 Ibid.
2 * 1 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddcley, 293-94.
2 *22Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 179.
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been sent by the Emperor to welcome and address the preliminary issues with the Tsar’s
representative. To speak to a lesser individual would counter this intention and demean
the Tsar’s authority and position. Spafarii proclaimed that if he must meet with Mala
before traveling to Peking, he had to do so face to f a c e ! ^
This reply prompted Mala to action. Spafarii had refused a logical and diplomatic
solution to both of their problems. He immediately fired back an ultimatum. Spafarii was
instructed to visit him in a nearby empty house, midway between the two camps. Mala
named the building an office, to remove the stigma o f personal property and assure that
neither ruler’s dignity was affronted. At this location, Mala would pose his required
questions. If Spafarii refused this reasonable solution, Mala warned, he would write a
scathing report to the Emperor indicating that Spafarii was as intractable and obstinate as
Baikov - 14 Unfortunately, this attempt to cow the Russian ambassador failed. Spafarii
stubbornly declared that he would not be ordered about like a commoner and refused to
go near the convenient building.
By February twenty-eighth, both sides recognized the need to cool off heated
tempers. Each offered the other substantial gifts in an attempt to salvage their mission.
Mala offered the Russians cheese, vegetables, tea, and pears to supplement the bland2134

213 Ibid., 181.
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Russian supplies.

Spafarii contributed a generous gift o f liqueurs and medication for

M ala’s injured leg to illustrate his desire to avoid future hostilities.^ 15
Beginning the next day, March first, 1675, discussions began in earnest to resolve
the location o f the first meeting. Mala offered several solutions. He suggested that the
Russian ambassador should pitch one o f his own tents in an adjacent field where the two
dignitaries could m eet.216 Qr, if this proved unacceptable, the Chinese could prepare an
area with their own tent, chairs, and table, all scrupulously equivalent. The two dignitaries
could then approach along two paths and arrive at the same instant, thus assuring neither
would gain advantage over the other.217 A third proposal v/as to travel to a distant
village where there were several buildings, all with very wide doors. The two dignitaries
could dismount before one of these dwellings and enter the building s im u lta n e o u sly .^ ^
Spafarii refused each o f these proposals in turn. He indicated that no Chinese
suggestion would be acceptable until he personally had delivered the Czar’s letter to the
E m p ero r.2 1 9 Later after serious consideration, Spafarii preferred his own solution to the

situation. He suggested that they forget the entire issue and simply begin traveling to 2156*9
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2 ^ Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddclcy, 295.
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Peking. The required discussions could be accomplished at the first halt along the
ro a d . 220 This way no more time would be lost in Naun.

Unfortunately, this suggestion violated Mala’s instructions. He had been tasked to
discover Russia’s true intentions in China. Had Russia come to discuss peaceful relations
or did they conceal a darker, more sinister interest? Was Spafarii’s purpose to scout
China’s military strength in preparation for a military invasion? Mala’s objective was to
discover the answers to these difficult questions by carefully interviewing Spafarii. Then,
after receiving satisfactory answers he was to examine Spafarii’s letter o f introduction and
official gifts. If Mala found Spafarii’s gifts lacking or suspected Spafarii o f duplicity,
Mala was to turn the Russian diplomat back, hairing his progress eastward, and insuring
he traveled no further into China than Naun.221
This assignment was endangered by Spafarii’s steadfast refusals. Precious time
was passing and Mala had disci ered only Spafarii’s intractable nature. He began to subtly
threaten the Russian ambassadi . indicating that he was required to make a full report to
the Emperor. He warned that his account would detail every Chinese effort to
accommodate Spafarii and describe the gracious goodwill heaped upon the foreign
dignitary since his arrival at Nai n. The narration would also record Spafarii’s brazen 201

220 Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 182.
221 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddclcy, 295.
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refusals and disagreeable behavior. Mala indicated that this report would be utilized by the
Emperor to decide if Spafarii would be allowed to continue to Peking.222
M ala’s threat was a genuine one. Spafarii had not acquitted himself favorably in
Naun. He had been unrealistic and difficult. In addition, he had spurned the Chinese
requests for meeting out of hand, despite the fact that several o f their suggestions were
completely acceptable by the provisions recorded in his instructions. In a letter to
Matveev, Spafarii relayed the tribulations o f his mission and cited the problems o f dealing
with the stubborn Chinese officials. He vaguely refers to several other occasions besides
meeting Mala where similar difficulties were experienced. Spafarii indicates, “there were
many other arguments between us (the Naun officials), too numerous to write in this
letter.”223
Spafarii’s response to Mala’s threat was immediate. Panicked, he promptly
indicated that he was now prepared to meet with Mala. He stipulated that a Russian tent
would be erected in the open ground between the Russian and Chinese compounds. He
would enter the dwelling and make the final preparations for M ala’s arrival.224 j n this
manner, Spafarii attempted to maintain the illusion that Mala was visiting him and
deferring to his stronger position. Furthermore, Spafarii dictated that Mala would have to 234

222 Spafarii, “Stalenii spisok,” 183.
223 Although Spafarii’s journal, official reports and letters do not describe the difficulties Spafarii
experienced and the confrontation he caused, it is clear from this statement that he understood how
difficult he was being and how upset he was making the Chinese. Ibid., 182.
224 Ibid., 182-83.
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wait until Spafarii was fully j vcpared to greet him and thus must wait nearby until invited
to enter.225 This action insured that Spafarii would be viewed as having the superior
hand and proclaimed his victory in the first clash of political negotiations.
In his journal, Spafarii rationalized his decision, not as fear but rather as a carefully
planned decision to eliminate growing frustration and dissonance. He indicated that the
Chinese had become extremely suspicious over his refusal to relinquish his letter o f
introduction. They had claimed the document must bear threats or other unfriendly
messages. Under increasing pressure from his men to continue the mission and to quell
the growing mistrust of the Chinese, Spafarii finally agreed to meet Mala. The fact that his
requirements for this meeting exactly correspond with an earlier Chinese suggestion,
indicates that he was actually capitulating to the Chinese threat despite his carefully
worded explanation. 226
With the initial argument decided, the two negotiators settled down to discuss the
real issues. Unfortunately, the atmosphere had not lost its hostility. Both sides were
suspicious and extremely wary of the other’s motives. After several minutes o f quiet,
Mala bluntly announced that he was required to open the Tsar’s letter and read it. He25*

225 Ibid., 183.
22fi Ibid. Spafarii’s instructions provide Spafarii no guidance on political meetings before he reaches the
capital city. They only explain his response if his efforts to see the Emperor is thwarted. In this case, the
most applicable information provided by Spafarii’s instructions arc to protect the Tsar’s honor, and to
capitulate to the desires of the Chinese emperor if the mission is threatened, because Spafarii was
required to meet with Mala before continuing to Peking, Spafarii could accept a political meeting without
violating his instructions. All three ofM ala’s final suggestions were based upon equality and ensured
that the Tsar’s sense of dignity would not be maned. Spafarii needed only to accept the most
advantageous suggestion and avoid a lengthy and distasteful argument.
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claimed the Emperor had instructed him to ensure that the letter was peaceful and
contained no hostile threats or disrespectful passages. He informed Spafarii that if he was
refused, he had no choice but to dismiss Spafarii and send him back to Russia in
disgrace.^27
Spafarii recognized this warning as a empty threat and flippantly replied that Mala
had not shown Spafarii documentation to prove his authority. Spafarii did not believe that
Mala had the authority to dismiss a full ambassador o f the Russian tsar. In addition,
Spafarii indicated that Mala’s distrustful and hostile treatment o f a personal representative
o f a foreign ruler was disgraceful, and severely questioned the wisdom o f proposing
peaceful relations with such a hostile country.228
Five days later, on March 6th, Mala introduced a new topic o f discussion, the
Amur Basin. Several times, Mala requested to know the Tsar’s response to the Emperor’s
1670 letter. That addressed the tribute problems created by the Russian Cossacks, and the
disposition of the Chinese traitor, Gantimur. He wished to discover Russia’s intentions278

227 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddelcy, 295.
228 o f course Spafarii was unable to provide Mala with his documentation. Since he had been given two
different sets o f letters he would not be able to determine if he should had over the ones proclaiming his
authority as ambassador or messenger. His instructions did not anticipate that the political discussions
would begin when Spafarii was several hundred miles from the Emperor. Because Spafarii had not yet had
the opportunity to present his documentation directly to the Emperor, a direct interpretation o f the
instructions required that no one else would be able to view them. “February 28, 1675 Instructions from
the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii (Milescu) for his embassy to the Chinese Empire,” in
Dmytryshin, 399. Spafarii often becomes melodramatic in the course of writing to the Tsar. Several
passages are clearly emphasized in the journal, almost always passages that exalt the Tsar and seem to be
added into the writing as a precautionary measure to ensure the Tsar would not feel sighted by the manner
and topic o f the discussion. Since Spafarii penned this portion of his journal at least a week, following the
events, He easily could fabricate the flowery complements to the Tsar within the discussions. Spafarii,
“Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddelcy, 296.
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toward this region and discuss preliminary guidelines for negotiating peace. Spafarii,
however, refused to discuss the Amur. He remarked that he knew nothing o f the Amur
situation and had received no instructions or authority to conduct peace negotiations.229
Spafarii freely admitted that he carried the Milovanov letter which outlined the
Chinese grievances in the Amur. But, although he held the document, the letter was
untranslated and its contents were unknown. He explained that one o f his many tasks in
China was to have the document, (and three other official documents from the last
century) translated and establish a common language for future discourse. Because o f this
problem, he knew nothing o f the Amur problem and could not address the issue
officially.230 Naturally, Mala did not believe Spafarii’s explanation, but he continued with
his other tasks, leaving the issue for future debate.
Mala returned to the previous problem, Spafarii’s credentials, and began to discuss
his requirement to examine the Tsar’s letter and the official gifts for suitability. Spafarii
was again difficult. He refused to hand over the Tsar’s letter, claiming he was instructed
to deliver it directly to the Emperor. Spafarii did confide to Mala that he personally knew
o f the letter’s contents and would stake his creditation on the fact that it contained no
offending passages nor hostilities o f any type. It simply indicated Russia’s intent to foster
peace and friendship. Mala requested that Spafarii put this assurance in writing. But2930

229 This seems to be a truthful argument. Spafarii was not given any official written instructions
regarding the Amur basin problem. But since he managed to have a Naun secretary translate the 1670
letter, and discussed Gantimur’s situation with the man during his voyage, Spafarii was well informed.
230 ibid., 296-97.
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Spafarii refused, indicating that he knew no Chinese and an assurance in Russian that the
Emperor could not read would be worthless.231 Spafarii then allowed Mala to examine
the falcons, the only presents he carried that could not be easily hidden from view. He
recorded that Mala seemed taken with the exceptional birds (they are very 1are in China)
and was particularly impressed with the white pair. 232 The remainder o f his gifts he kept
hidden and refused to display them to Askaniama.
The next day (March seventh), Mala returned to present his dilemma to Spafarii.
He had been instructed to report to the Emperor, but he had little positive information to
report. He had not read the Tsar’s letter, and could not offer any assurances on the
document’s contents. He had not viewed the official gifts Spafarii carried, except for the
falcons, and they alone were an insubstantial offering. Additionally, Spafarii had refused
to provide information on any issue Mala proposed. Even Spafarii’s verbal assurance o f
the letter’s contents was unsatisfactory because he refused to make an official record.
Mala stated the ambiguity o f Spafarii’s intentions left him without alternatives. Since,
Spafarii had not complied with any of his requests, Mala did not have authorization to
allow him to travel toward Peking. In addition, his orders did not permit him to dismiss231

2 3 1He indicated in his letter to the Tsar that the traitorous Russians in China would mistranslate his
words to the Chinese and thus poison Russia’s attempt to establish relations. Spafarii clearly did not
desire to have an official written record. At this point, Spafarii knew for certain that Latin priests were in
Peking and he could have easily complied with Mala’s request by using Latin. Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,”
191.
232 Apparently only two o f the white falcons remained by the time Spafarii reached China. Spafarii,
“Tobolsk to Chinese Frontier.” in Baddclcy, 703.
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the Russian ambassador.233 He was required to petition Peking for authorization to
begin traveling toward the capital. When Spafarii failed to clarify his remarks o f the
previous day or offer more information for Mala’s report, Mala dispatched a full
explanation \o the E m p e r o r . S p a f a r i i , Mala declared, would simply have to hope for
the best.
During the next month, Spafarii and Mala became better aquatinted while they
waited for a response from Peking. Gifts were freely exchanged and the two diplomats
developed a grudging respect for each other. Mala was particularly interested in the
celebration o f Easter, which the Russians observed by giving small gifts to the villagers.
Spafarii personally presented several gilt eggs to the Chinese diplomat as special presents
from the Russian entourage.235
Shortly following the Easter ceremony, Mala indicated that he had a matter o f
great secrecy to discuss with Spafarii. Mala provided undeniable proof that one o f
Spafarii’s men, a translator originally born in China, was spreading lies ? out the
Ambassador’s assembly.236 Mala explained that the man, after trying several times to
receive an audience with him, resorted to telling the townsmen and the Chinese clerks that
Spafarii’s group was little more than a front. The translator claimed that one hundred23456
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thousand men stood ready in nearby regions for the signal to descend upon the Chinese to
slaughter and pillage.23 7 Spafarii replied that this same man had come to him earlier in
the week with a similar story. According to this individual, Mala’s report had been a
request for Chinese troops to descend upon Spafarii’s group and kill every member o f the
entourage. Spafarii had ignored this tale and treated the man with contempt. Since no
country would unnecessarily kill an official ambassador, the man was obviously
mistaken.238
When confronted by Spafarii and Mala, the interpreter explained that he was
interested in how thv Chinese would respond to such a threat. Spafarii was furious and
ordered the man to be tortured and executed, but Mala intervened. He asked Spafarii to
spare the man, at least until he could be returned to Russia. Mala explained that China did
not want Russian blood spilled on Chinese soil. Spafarii willingly complied with this
request, but supervised several torture sessions before releasing the man to Milovanov's
custody for transport to A lbazin/39
For the prisoner the issue was over, but Spafarii had to quell the ugly gossip o f an
impending Russian attack. By April second, it was clear many o f the Chinese in Naun
believed the rumor. Mangutei, the young Voevoda, requested an audience with Spafarii
and asked if he was expecting anyone from Russia. Spafarii indicated he was not237*9
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anticipating anyone, but during the days that followed the question was repeated :t:verai
times and became more and more insistent.240 Finally on the tenth o f April, Spafarii
suggested that perhaps the Tsar had sent a dispatch to him, or possibly the small group he
had assigned to travel to Yakustsk to retrieve large walrus tusks had finally completed
their assignments and returned to the entourage. Spafarii explained that both o f these
groups could not seriously be considered an invasion force, and were barely large enough
to ensure safety.241
On April twelfth, the mystery was solved. Three men were escorted into Naun to
meet with Spafarii. One was an official courier from Moscow' carrying a box o f carefully
protected medicines from the Tsar. He was accompanied by a boyar-son from Lena—his
companion since Moscow—and a Tungus guide from Nerchinsk. After an hour detainment
with the Voevodas o f Naun to determine their motive, the three were allowed to speak to
Spafarii 242 These men indicated that the border Chinese were extremely agitated and
afraid o f their small group. Despite the fact that their entire group numbered less than
twenty, the Chinese believed that this band was the promised invasion force and was bent
upon destru ctio n . 243 instead, the Oroup proved to be a peaceful courtier detachment
hurrying to catch Ambassador Spafarii to deliver medicines and prized walrus tusks.24013
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The next day word arrived from Peking indicating that Spafarii and 150 men would
be allowed to continue to Peking. Mala personally presented the good news to Spafarii.
Because arrangements had been made for lodging and transportation all the way to
Peking, the actual journey should be swift and effortless. Mala indicated they would begin
traveling during the early morning of April seventeenth and both the Russian and Chinese
camps should begin immediately preparing for the jo u rn e y e d

With great haste, Spafarii’s entourage and Mala’s detachment departed Naun on
the seventeenth. Traveling swiftly, the group made excellent time for nearly a week. Then
minor problems began to plague the group. The group’s original pace was too rapid for
many o f the horses, especially Spafarii’s original pack animals which had not fully
recovered from the stress of winter travel. A large number o f cattie and horses died and
the group was forced to stop often and rest the exhausted livestock.245 On the morning
o f April twenty-eighth, the group awoke to find that ten o f Mala’s horses had spooked
during the night and were scattered throughout the countryside. The group was forced to
wait the entire morning while the renegades were rounded up.246
The most eventful incident occurred as the group neared the great city itself. Mala
halted the group and anxiously explained that an official van was approaching. Proper 2456

244 Ibid., 204.
245 Ibid., 208-09.
246 Ibid., 209.
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protocol demanded that Spafarii, his men, and his Chinese escorts dismount and bow as
the van passed. But Spafarii had no intention of dismounting. Exhibiting his customary
stubbornness, he refused to follow Mala’s instructions—especially when he learned that the
van contained only the Emperor’s letter instead of an important personage. Spafarii did ,
however, make a concession. After arguing the point for several minutes, Spafarii agreed
to ride off main road, down a short turnoff. This way he was not on the same road as the
official otter and was exempted from performing the customary homage. 247
During the tedious journey from Naun, Mala and Spafarii became better
acquainted and spent many long hours in idle discussion. Mala used the opportunity to
educate Spafarii on Chinese customs, proper protocol, and the Chinese viewpoint. He
informed Spafarii that he must give up the Tsar’s letter to the “officer o f State” as soon as
he reached the capital. The letter needed to be translated and its information analyzed
before the document could be offered to the Emperor. Only after the Emperor had
accepted the Tsar’s letter could Spafarii be presented to him and the other tasks
ad d ressed . 248 Spafarii disputed this custom with Mala for many miles, claiming that it

was contrary to established European protocol and completely unacceptable. He ignored
M ala’s warning that without following Chinese customs he would be dismissed like Fedor
Baikov and his mission would fail.24924789

247 Ibid., 217-18.
248 Ibid., 218.
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Mala and Spafarii finally reached Peking on May fifteenth, 1675. As a foreign
dignitary, Spafarii was assigned to a wide courtyard near the palace in which to establish
his camp. This particular courtyard had been used previously by representatives from
Holland and the Netherlands and most recently by the Portuguese. Although the grounds
themselves were run-down and dilapidated, Spafarii was not overly dismayed with the
state o f his accommodations. The courtyard provided ample room to pitch the
entourage’s tents and Spafarii and his men were well used to their spartan
accommodations after fourteen and a half months on the road from Moscow.250 Spafarii
was however, extremely upset by the contingent o f armed guards that ringed the Russian’s
enclosure. Although thr Chinese indicated the guards were there to protect the Russians
and ensure thieves and cutthroats did not prey upon the visiting group, Spafarii concluded
the guards were really to keep a close watch upon his men and their activities, and to
ensure that all contact with the Chinese was officially sanctioned.251
Once Spafarii and his men were settled into their compound, Mala and his assistant
visited the Russian ambassador to reopen the issue o f the Tsar’s letter. Mala explained
that Spafarii should not be surprised that official correspondence was presented to the Li
Fan Yuan before ambassadors were granted audiences with the Emperor. He carefully
asserted that the official documents needed to be preexamined before being handled by the
Emperor. It was necessary to ensure errors in greeting and impolite wording was2501

250 Ibid., 222.
251 Ibid., 231.
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removed before being viewed by the most powerful person in the Chinese civilization. He
revealed that the custom o f surrendering the letter was established centuries ago when the
Emperor received a discourteous and insulting document.252 Mala maintained that the
custom could not be revoked and to alter it after all these years would not only insult the
rulers and ambassadors o f other countries—primarily the Portuguese and the Dutch—but
would compromise the honor and respect o f the Emperor in the eyes o f neighboring
sta te s. 253 Mala concluded his explanation by comparing the present situation with a

pervious visit by Baikov twenty years before. He insinuated that like Baikov, Spafarii
could easily be dismissed unless he willingly presented the document to the proper
officials. In addition, Mala informed Spafarii that tentative arrangements were being made
for a personal audience with the Emperor, but unless Spafarii immediately relinquished the
letter, the audience would be canceled. 254
Spafarii, ever obstinate, refused to accept Mala’s prudent rendition o f the current
situation. Ignoring Mala’s narration, Spafarii steadfastly reiterated his position. He felt
that because accepting both the ambassador and the letter together was a world-accepted
custom, to ignore the practice would greatly insult the Tsar and indicate that he was
inferior to the Chinese ruler. To Spafarii, altering the Chinese custom could not be
interpreted as dishonorable, because as he maintained, the Tsar was a greater ruler than all2534

252 Ibid., 223.
253 Ibid., 224.
254 Ibid., 225.
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the others who had visited China. Since the other countries realized Russia’s superior
position in the world’s hierarchy, they would not be insulted if the Chinese granted
Russia’s small request. Even more importantly, Spafarii argued, Russia was more
important to China than the lesser European countries. Russia was a good deal closer
than the Roman Caesar and the Turkish Sultan and could offer China economic as well as
military benefits.255
In conclusion, Spafarii suggested that since the Tsar was invited to be friends by
the Chinese emperor’s 1654 message, the acceptance o f the Tsar’s letter according to
European custom would intensify the Emperor’s glory and strength. Friendship with so
powerful a neighbor, Spafarii explained, would make China’s allies rejoice and her
enemies trem ble. 256 Unfortunately for Russia, Spafarii’s desire was clearly exposed. If
the Chinese revamped their customary protocol to suit the Russian entourage, Russia
would gain a great deal o f power and prestige in the negotiations to come 3nd in their
relative place in the European world.
The decided reluctance on the Chinese pan to alter their customs and accept this
logic infuriated Spafarii. Angrily, he outlined an ultimatum The Chinese could either
allow him to deliver his letter as he was instructed or dismiss him as they had threatened
earlier. There was o f course a third option. The Chinese could take the letter by force,*256

^ S p a f a r ii certainly must have realized that Russia docs not rank ahead o f the rest o f Europe at this point
in history. He was either embellishing the truth to reach his goal or he was embellishing his account of
the argument to impress the Tsar and further bolster the Tsar’s opinion o f him. Ibid., 222-23.
256 Ibid., 223.

120

but Spafarii was violently opposed to this alternative and, as he informed Mala, an
altercation would result in certain bloodshed. ^57 Mala chose none o f these options.
Instead, he decided to introduce the President of his board, Alikhamba, to the negotiations
and patiently readdress points o f difficulty with a higher authority.258
Mala also introduced a second man to the negotiations, a Jesuit priest named
Ferdinand Verbiest.259 During the previous discussions, communications had been
extremely poor. Spafarii spoke no Mandarin or Manchu and the few translators that
accompanied him were largely illiterate and limited in vocabulary and understanding.
Likewise the Chinese translators spoke different dialects than the Tungus guides and often
faced serious difficulties exchanging the simplest ideas. Conversations had to be repeated
three or four times to ensure the gist o f the dialogue was understood. To solve this
difficulty and introduce a more convincing negotiator into the argument, Mala brought
Verbiest to Spafarii’s compound.
Ferdinand Verbiest occupied an unusual position in the Chinese government.
Acting as a confidential adviser, translator and honored guest, Verbiest was extremely well
respected and fairly powerful for a foreigner. He had arrived in China in 1659 and had
traveled extensively through the southern region as he converted the Chinese to
Christianity. In 1660, the elderly Jesuit priest, Adam Schall, recommended the youngster 257*9

257 Ibid., 224-25.
2^8 Spafarii apparently did not know his name. The proper title is Alikha Amba. Ibid., 225.
259 Ibid., 226.
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to replace him as the head o f the Mathematics board, a body that studied astrology,
mathematics and other issues o f science. 260 jn a short time, Verbiest became an
indispensable and valued member of the young Emperor’s inner council. He assisted the
Emperor in learning Manchu261 and instnicted him in the inner-workings o f the
Mathematics board. As a valued confidant, the Emperor had personally confirmed
Verbiest’s rank and position in the Chinese court and he was clearly a privileged court
favorite. 26^
Verbiest’s arrival simplified the negotiations. With his assistance, discussions
could be concluded in Latin without fear o f misunderstanding or insult. 263 Exact
translations o f official titles and documents were possible and the current dispute could be
resolved without further language frustration. However, Verbiest’s entry into the
negotiations did not guarantee a solution. 264 Mala discovered that even if Spafarii could
be convinced to relinquish his letter, it was unclear whether he would be willing to 260*

260 Ibid.
2^ ! Although the Emperor was Manchu by birth, he had been fostered in the capital and had undoubtedly
been educated in the language of the Chinese govcmmcnt-Chinesc instead of his native tongue. Ibid.,
226-27.
262 Ibid.
2°-hn fact this is what the government hoped for when they appointed Spafarii. His Latin skills were of
the utmost importance because of the probabilities o f meeting the Jesuits in China. Ibid.
2^4 in addition to his language ability', Verbiest brought his knowledge of the Chinese government into
the discussion and provided invaluable information to Spafarii during the course o f the negotiation. He
informed Spafarii that Mala had lied when he indicated that the Emperor did not know o f the difficulty' of
presenting the letter at the board. In fact, he informed Spafarii that three separate times he had witnessed
Mala and the Alikhamba reporting the lack of progress. The Emperor had commanded that all the
ancient records should be reviewed to see if a precedent existed for him to receive Spafarii’s credentials
himself. Ibid., 236-37.
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kowtow. He desired assurances that if an agreement on the letter was reached, Spafari*
would accede to the ancient act o f homage. Spafarii classified the kowtow as a separate
argument, and refused to discuss the topic until the disposition o f the letter was
settled. 265
After fourteen days o f heated debate, Mala presented the following solution.

The great Emperor, honoring the Tsar’s majesty above all other sovereigns,
his embassy beyond all other that have ever been here, has commanded to
have a place prepared; and at that place will be gathered mandarins and
most intimate counselors and to-marrow, at the first hour, horses will be
sent and all the Tsar’s gifts will be put on little tables which will be carried
before you, either by your own people, or ours, as you may prefer. After
that all three versions o f the Tsar’s letter will be carried in your fashion ,
whatever that may be, and when you reach the {forbidden} city , a place
will be ready, facing the Emperor’s throne; and there you will set down the
letters; and the gifts will be set close by. The first Kolai266wju be there, he
who rules the Chinese empire, who is moreover a relative o f the Emperor,
when you have handed over the Tsar’s letter and gifts without a word, you
will go back to your lodging; but be it known that in front o f the Em peror’s
palace there is a stone column, on which is written the Emperor’s name and
when the Emperor’s brother, or any other Mandarin comes to that column
he has to dismount.2^7

Spafarii disliked the condition that he dismount at the pillar but agreed on the
stipulation that it was “their inveterate custom, and they were not merely inventing it for265*

265 Spafarii, “Slatenii spisok,” 248.
266 A Kolia is the E.nperor's immediate administrators-councilors of the first rank--and were the true
administrators of the realm
262
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his benefit, to make him go on foot.“268 He insisted that he and his men be provided
with horses in order to ride to that point. Finally., after confirming that the Koiai offered a
higher honor than the Emperor’s brother, Spafarii agreed to nearly all o f Mala’s
conditions. The one remaining area o f contention was the presentation o f the gifts. In the
end, Spafarii decided to allow the gifts tc be carried before his procession on small tables
so they were immediately at hand during the audience, but he accepted that no formal
presentation would be allowed.269
This agreement left several items ambiguous. For example, the description implied
that the Emperor would be present. For Spafarii to make his formal presentation facing
the throne would seem sensible only if the chair were occupied. Secondly, the Chinese’s
presentation o f the arrangements indicated that this procession would be a special
consideration. Spafarii was being allowed to act in a manner different from other visiting
dignitaries. In reality, the arrangements were identical-including Spafarii’s location—to
the practice established for lesser princes delivering tribute and offering fidelity to the
Emperor.270 Third and finally, the agreement implied that although the Koiai would
receive the letter, he would then immediately deliver it into the Emperor’s own hand. The
implication was that it would be handed to the Emperor during the same ceremony.2689*

268 Spafarii, “Stalcnii spisck,” 249.
269 Spafarii’s agreement is unusually meek. He failed to provide an explanation o f his reasoning.
However, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese provided him with an ultimatum and he concluded
that unless he agreed his mission would end disastrously. Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking," in Baddcley,
350.
2 2 9 S p a f a r ii, “ S p a th a r y in P e k in g ,” in B a d d c le y , 3 5 2 .
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On June fifth, Spafarii delivered the Tsar’s letter to the Kolai. According to
Spafarii’s account o f the event in Statenii Spisok, he and a small number o f men rode to
the Em peror’s pillar and dismounted. With the official gifts and letter proudly displayed
before them, the group traveled to the assembly. Spafarii ceremoniously presented the
document and returned to his compound without a single comment.271 Unfortunately
this account o f the events is extremely suspect.
In Spafarii’s official journal, the page that describe the events o f June fifth is
missing. Chin suggests the page was tom out perhaps to protect the size o f Spafarii’s
misunderstanding.272 The j esuit priest, Grimaldi, recorded the incident and indicated
that the Tsar’s letter was opened and read aloud during the assembly.273 To make matters
worse, the Emperor was not present, and so the entire court heard the Tsar’s greeting and
message o f goodwill before the Emperor had glimpsed the document. Despite these
problems, Spafarii seemed pleased with the procession. His position seemed to be
honored above other visiting ambassadors and Mala had promised an audience with the
Emperor for the following day.274271*

271 Ibid., 249.
272During Spafarii’s homeward journey, his men brought charges against him for his behavior in Peking.
Because Aleksei died while Spafarii was abroad, Spafarii had lost his main supporter and the men could
safely claim Spafarii was a traitor and blame him for the mission’s failure. The tme events o f the meeting
could be incriminating to an unsympathetic council. Chin, 102.
27^ Philippo Maria Grimaldi. Spafarii, “Spathaiy in Peking,” in Baddclcy. 352.
2 7 4 S p a f a r ii, “ S t a t e n ii s p is o k ,” 2 5 1 .
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Now that the disposition of the Tsar’s letter was finished, Spafarii turned his
attention to the upcoming audience. As his first opportunity to greet and speak openly
with the Chinese emperor, Spafarii wanted to ensure that this ceremony would follow
closer along

'nv e..n lines. He asked Mala if the Emperor would request the status o f

the Tsar’s health during the audience. Mala indicated that he felt the Emperor would ask
after the Tsar’s heath during the audience, but if not, the Emperor would most likely take
Spafarii aside for a private audience and inquire after the Tsar’s health and several other
things that had sparked his interest.775 Spafarii responded positively to M ala’s reassuring
statement. He commented that it would be acceptable if the Emperor asked about the
Tsar’s health after the audience, but it would be preferable if he did so during the event
“when I see his eyes for the first time.”276 He asked Mala if he could request for the
Emperor to address the issue during the audience instead o f afterwards.
Mala indicated that it would be unwise to make such a presumptuous request. He
explained that it was urgent not to “damage the Khan’s friendly inclination toward the
Tsar.”277 The j esujt also confirmed this sentiment. He mentioned that formal requests
were viewed suspiciously. It would be much better if the request were made informally
through the Emperor’s valet. Verbiest explained that the young man who had often
entered Spafarii’s compound to deliver messages to Mala and himself was the Emperor’s2756

275 Ibid., 252.
276 Ibid., 253.
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personal valet and messenger. He could be relied upon to present Spafarii’s position fairly
for the Emperor’s consideration.27827980* Using this method, Verbiest explained, the young
boy had requested and received permission for him to freely visit the Russian compound
without restriction.2^9
The next day (June sixteenth), Spafarii and twenty men were taken to the
enormous courtyard where the Emperor held audiences. In the Pavilion o f Purple Light,
while Spafarii waited for the Emperor to appear, Verbiest joined his party. He explained
that he was assigned to assist Spafarii in understanding the required rituals and to instruct
him on performing the kowtow. (Spafarii had refused to practice the maneuver whenever
the Chinese attempted to instruct him on the proper form.) Spafarii and Verbiest watched
as a large group o f nearly fifty Chinese repetitively performed the kowtow. Verbiest
explained that these men had just been made Mandarins by the Emperor and their
ceremony had been scheduled to offer Spafarii the opportunity to observe the ritual
kowtow before performing it in front o f the Emperor.280
When Spafarii’s audience began, he approached the Emperor with Verbiest and his
twenty men arranged behind him.281 Court attendants struck the ground three times with
triple strokes. A bell rang, music played, drums sounded, and the order “bow down” rang

278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Spafarii, “Spalhary in Peking,” in Baddclcy, I'io-CO.
28 * This location was located 980 feel from the Emperor’s position. Neither Spafarii nor his men could
see the Emperor or even the location of his throne because of the overall height o f the dais and the
enclosure o f the Pavilion of Purple Light. Ibid., 360.
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across the courtyard.

Instead o f performing the slow, stately ritual the Mandarins had

executed earlier, Spafarii bowed rapidly, refusing to touch the ground or slow his action.
The surrounding officials were outraged and chastised the Russian ambassador. They
implored him to honor the dignity of the Emperor, but Spafarii stubbornly declined.2822834 He
venomously refused to alter his method, indicating that the Mandaiins are “the servants
and slaves of the Emperor and are able to worship in this way—but we are not his servants
and bow in our own fashion”. 283
Spafarii and Verbiest then proceeded forward, walking slowly and deliberately
across the courtyard despite the continuous urgings by the Chinese officials to run. When
finally they reached the receiving room, they were seated approximately fifty-six feet from
the throne, where they could easily view the Emperor and the royal court. Mala joined
Spafarii and quietly pointed out the Emperor’s brothers and other high officials. Tea was
shared and music played in the background but no official words were exchanged. 284
The audience was clearly a formal event and Spafarii was supposed to be honored simply
by sharing the Emperor’s presence.
The discussions on the seventeenth o f June began with heated complaints o f the
previous day’s audience. Both Spafarii and Verbiest protested loudly to Mala, indicating
that the treatment o f the Tsar’s embassy was beneath the dignity o f the Emperor. They

282 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 259-60.

283 Ibid., 259.
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argued that the Dutch envoy had been better treated than Spafarii and was granted an
immediate personal audience with the Emperor. The Tsar’s stature and position required
at least equivalent treatment.285 Mala responded that the previous day’s audience was
formal and primarily for appearances. Soon the Emperor would grant a personal audience
and this grievance would be forgotten. In the meantime, Mala had arranged trading rights
for Spafarii.286 Chinese traders would be allowed to enter the Russian’s compound to
negotiate and trade with the visiting Russians. The compound guards were responsible for
maintaining comprehensive lists chronicling all goods taken in or out o f the enclosure.
Mala explained that the lists must be maintained to ensure that the Chinese traders did not
attempt to cheat the Emperor’s honored guests.287
At this point, Spafarii allowed Mala to examine the four official correspondences
that Russia had collected over the last fifty years.288 He had attempted several times to
receive an unofficial translation o f these documents as he traveled to Peking, but the
Chinese officials (save for the Naun secretary) recognized the documents as letters o f the
Emperor and refused. A partial translation Spafarii acquired from a semi-literate soldier
was unreliable. Without a dependable translation, Spafarii’s instructions indicated he was*

785 Spafarii Led brought :he records of the previous Dutch and Portuguse embassies with him to review.
Mala responded to his accusations by claiming the Dutch had lied in their account. Spafarii, “Spatharv in
Peking,” in Pr-fdelcy, 361.
786 ibid. Upon Spafarii’s initial entry into Peking, he began an intensive argument over trading rights.
The Chinese custom was to allow traders and caravans to trade openly. But official ambassadorial
missions were denied this privilege. As political representives, the Chinese argued, Spafarii and men were
here to discuss affairs of state, not haggle prices and amass goods.
787 Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 262.
788 ibid., 263.
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to acquire one from the Chinese officials. However, Spafarii also felt to documents were
the personal property c f the Tsar and he refused to allow them to leave his possession.
Mala was forced to cal! in an old Chinese scribe to cope and translate the documents. The
two oldest documents were immediately translated and presented to Spafarii, but. the
newer more pertinent documents were simply copied. Their contents were not made clear
to Spafarii until several weeks later.289
Despite these thorny issues and the suspicion it heaped on the Russian ambassador,
the next few weeks passed quietly and without difficulty. Verbiest visited nearly every
day, merchants were allowed into the compound to trade, and discuss goods, but they
were searched upon their departure. Mala reported the Emperor was now deliberating and
preparing his written response to the Tsar’s letter.290 Arid as the days passed, he
continuously made small requests to satisfy the Emperor’s curiosity about the Russians.
For example, the Emperor had seen one o f Spafarii’s paintings o f Christian saints and
asked if Spafarii had a painter with him who could paint the likeness o f Chinese
personages. 291 On another occasion, he asked if a Russian could demonstrate how to
make slippers.292 Several times, he requested that Spafaiii’s men be allowed to perform
swimming demonstrations for the Emperor’s amusement.29328901

289 ibid
290 Ibid., 266-67.
291 Ibid., 267.
292 He wanted a pair made from soft glazed leather (Moroccan leather) that was normally made into red
or yellow Turkish style slippers. Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddclcy, 365.
292 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 291.
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On July nineteenth, Spafarii was finally allowed to dine with the Emperor. He
asked after the Emperor’s health exactly as the Prikaz officials had planned. When the
Emperor returned the question, Spafarii responded with the boastful speech his
instructions required. The events that followed this official exchange are unfortunately
lost. The Chinese viewed the occasion as minor and made no official records o f the
encounter. Spafarii, on the other hand, wrote several pages in his journal. But these
enlightening pages are missing and details o f the dinner are unknown.294
After this dinner, however, Spafarii rapidly lost favor with both the Emperor and
the Chinese officials. Although this decision was not sudden, Spafarii was never wellliked in Peking. He was only tolerated as the Russian official ambassador. From the very
beginning, Spafarii required coercion, flattery, wheedling, and excessive amounts o f
arguing to provided the simplest information or to agree to the smallest ritual. For
example, it required Mala tv/enty-six days o f pleading and arguing to view Spafarii’s
credentials and ensure that he was in fact an official Russian representative. Even during
the period that Spafarii held the Emperor’s curiosity, he was impossible. To the
Em peror’s request that Spafarii have a portrait made o f himself, Spafarii replied that he
was too tired and the Emperor would have to wait for the painting.295

294it is easy to anticipate that a conflict or confrontation must have occurred to account for the Chinese
response, but it is entirely possible that Spafarii was well mannered and submissive. The pages could
have teen removed to ensure that he could not be accused of demeaning the Tsar’s dignity. The issue of
the nussing pages has never been fully examined and the reason for their absence remains a mystery.
Spaft.rii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddelcy, 388. Spafarii, 296.
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As each day o f Spafarii’s six-month stay in China passed, Spafarii discovered new
arguments to present to the Chinese officials or chose to flaunt a time-honored Chinese
custom. The disrespectful and callous mannerisms Spafarii displayed at the formal
audience were typical of his actions, and the Chinese officials gradually stopped hiding
these petty arguments from the Emperor.
Spafarii’s Cossacks did little to assist the situation. Numerous quarrels broke out
between Spafarii’s men and several of the guards and gatemen. Although initially not
violent, the disagreeable actions of the Cossacks were mentioned to Spafarii as
unnecessary and vulgar. Several men apparently escaped from the compound and
wandered throughout the city without guard or escort.

Spafarii blamed the incident on

the restrictive provision that kept his men with the compound.296 To solve this difficulty,
Mala arranged for Spafarii’s men to be escorted into Peking in groups o f twenty to trade
and look at the vast city.297 But these supervised excursions were not enough for the
riotous, barbarous Cossacks. They returned complaining that they had only been allowed
to trade in one store and were denied the opportunity to visit entertainment

776 Ambassadors and other dignitaries were housed in compounds that enclosed their entire entourage.
This ensured the diplomats’ safety and ensured their isolation. Traders from neighboring countries,
however, were allowed to trade freely and travel throughout the city at will. It was Chinese custom that
traders be allowed free trade in the streets of Peking, but ambassadors, entrusted with official business,
were carefully guarded and isolated. Spafarii concluded that the Chinese real motivation was to inflate
the prices o f their own goods while forcing the Russians to accept relatively low prices for theirs. The
Chinese obviously resold the goods on the general market and lined their pockets with the profits.
Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddcley, 381.
777 Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 300.
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establishments. As a result, the Cossacks continued to escape through the compound’s
fence at night and create drunker, disturbances in the streets.298
On the twenty-sixth, Mala requested that Spafarii address his men. It was
becoming extremely difficult to hide the Cossacks’ activities from the Emperor.299 j w0
days later, after no progress was made, Mala’s supervisor, the president o f the
Ceremonies Board, informed Spafarii that his men were attacking the Chinese guards that
ringed the compound and were beating them. These men then departed into the city to
cause mischief. Spafarii openly lied to this official and implied that he had not heard o f
this problem before. He promised that in the future, his Cossacks would remain within the
compound and not travel outside o f it without their guards.30°
By the thirteenth o f August, the Chinese officials began to make departure
preparations for Spafarii. He was instructed to travel to the palace to receive the
Em peror’s gifts to the Tsar. True to form, Spafarii flaunted traditional Chinese custom.
He refused to fall upon his knees to accept the presents. He claimed that slaves and
subjects accepted gratuities from their sovereigns in that manner and that it was
unacceptable for him to accede to this custom.301 No amount o f reasoning, pleading or
intimidation could alter his position. Spafarii was sent back to his compound while Mala
and the other officials discussed Spafarii’s latest departure from customs. Two days later,298301

298 Chin, 42.
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Spafarii was again brought to the palace and allowed to accept the gifts without kneeling.
However, the Chinese’s disgust and displeasure was clearly evident. The official gifts
were piled at one side o f the room and there was no ritual or ceremony involved. The
Chinese did not hand the gifts to Spafarii and required his men to lift and carry each item
back to the compound.302
Within two weeks o f this occurrence, Spafarii was dismissed from Peking. On
August twenty-ninth, Spafarii returned to the palace to receive the Em peror’s letter for the
Tsar and to hear the parting farewell. The Chinese implored him to kneel to hear the
Em peror’s written message, but Spafarii refused. The angry uproar o f the Chinese
officials at this refusal stunned Spafarii and he dropped to his knees in sh o ck . 303 The
Kolai delivered the Emperor’s message and Mala translated the dreadful news for Spafarii.

The Emperor does not choose to write any answer the Tsar for two
reasons. First because you have been disobedient, refusing to accept the
gifts for your sovereign lord on your knees, as do the other envoys o f
neighboring monarchs; nor indeed does anyone dare to impugn that
custom; Secondly, even if the Emperor chose to write to the Tsar, his only
real object is to have Gantimur sent here, and that was stated in his former
letter...More that that~in future, we will have neither letter, nor
ambassadors, nor envoys, nor merchants from the land o f the Tzar. 304

302 Ibid., 311.
3^*3 Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddeley, 403.
3®4 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 315. Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddeley, 385.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND REALITIES

Spafarii’s mission can only be labeled a failure. Since he was originally sent to
China to accomplish two primary goals, establishing friendly relations to facilitate further
communication and negotiating a trade agreement, his inability to accomplish either issue
confirms that the entire mission failed to meet its objective. Spafarii’s attempts to impose
European protocol and procedures on the Chinese resulted in widespread animosity and
resulted in his unceremonious dismissal from Peking. His efforts to lay the foundation for
trade faired little better. Hindered by the Chinese dictum that political ambassadors were
forbidden to trade, Spafarii’s efforts to develop a dialogue on the subject were ineffective
and he was unable to engage Mala in meaningful negotiation. But why was Spafarii
unable to complete his mission? Was it due to an inherent incompatibility o f two distinct
cultures and political systems, or factors aligned more closely to the mission itself—
Spafarii’s inflexible instructions and the lack of information on the Amur basin issue? Or
could it have been the insensible, intractable, insulting nature o f the Russian ambassador?
While all o f these factors heavily influenced the mission’s outcome, it was Spafarii’s
conscious decision to spurn the Chinese, their customs, and the entire negotiation process
that ultimately resulted in his removal from Peking.
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In every international political confrontation, cultural differences play a major
role. Incorporating small items, such as words without parallel meanings, or giant issues
like opposing religious views, cultural differences account for the majority o f difficulties
experienced by political negotiators. But cultural confrontations are a daily challenge for a
skilled ambassador, and a talented individual can compensate for nearly any extreme in
viewpoint. Spafarii’s mission should have been no different. Although the Chinese
culture that Spafarii faced was radically different than his own, room did exist for
compromise. On several occasions when it seemed that no agreement could be reached,
the Chinese negotiator attempted to discover a solution that was acceptable to both
parties. For example, at Naun, Spafarii refused to hand Mala his official correspondence
so he could determine if unintentional offenses were made. Mala was willing to accept
Spafarii’s written assurance o f the contents of the Tsar’s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .-^ On another
occasion, Spafarii refused to kneel, explaining that the action was beneath the Tsar’s
stature. (He also claimed that it was raining and the area where the Chinese officials
desired him to kneel was extremely muddy.) The next day, Mala arranged for Spafarii to
carry out his business without kneeling. ^06
Although some allowances were made to accommodate Spafarii, other customs
were inviolate. The kowtow and the receipt o f the official correspondence by the Chinese
court were two events that could not be avoided. Despite Spafarii’s lengthy arguments3056
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against them, he was required to perforin these actions to accomplish his mission.^07
Some question does remain about the malleability o f these customs. If Spafarii had
been more accommodating and willing to negotiate compromise earlier in his mission,
what creative middle ground could Mala have arranged in the interest o f peace and
political harmony? The evidence indicates that China was extremely interested in ensuring
that Russia’s peaceful mission was successful. Since China desired peace in the Amur
basin, Mala was obviously instructed to be as accommodating as possible to the Russian
ambassador. In Naun, Mala’s tremendous efforts to arrange first a meeting location and
then means to accomplish his mission without violating Spafarii’s instructions demonstrate
the Chinese interest in concluding an agreement.308
In addition, two separate events support the conclusion that without Spafarii’s
demanding and insulting approach, the Chinese were interested in negotiating with the
Russians. The first item developed from the Chinese actions immediately following the
Em peror’s declaration that all contact be severed. Recognizing that the Russian
ambassador was the primary problem, the Chinese officials stripped Spafarii o f authority
and asked his men directly if they would accept the Emperor’s letter and follow all
Chinese customs. Ignoring Spafarii’s warnings that to accept the document on their knees
would bring dishonor to the Tsar, the men agreed to carry the Emperor’s message.3*^30789
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The Chinese officials’ willingness to continue communications with Russia and their
inventive idea o f presenting the Rusrian Cossacks with official communications indicate
that the primary stumbling block was not the Chinese, or the issues, but raiher the Russian
ambassador.
The issues themselves present the second incident. The pressing nature o f the
Russian desire to trade, and the continuing interest in the Amur basin conflict, prompted a
second ambassadorial mission to China. This mission, occurring jusi fourteen years after
the first, was tasked with a comparable assignment—establish trade and negotiate an end to
conflict in the Amur basin. From the beginning, it was obvious that this mission would be
very different from the first. Peter Golovin, Russia’s chosen ambassador, adopted a less
abrasive approach and attempted to be extremely reasonable when dealing with the
Chinese. He was instructed to be eloquent and utilize friendly persuasion to accomplish
his mission. The result was success. Golovin was able to negotiate a fledgling trade
agreement and a peaceful settlement o f the Amur basing 10
Golovin’s success however, indicated only that the Chinese had no reservations
about negotiating with the Russians. It does not guarantee that if Golovin had been
assigned the 1675 mission, he would have been as successful. Although the cultural
climate changed very little in fourteen short years, the political atmosphere had become 310
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pressing. Russia was being steadily drawn into a European effort to eliminate the power
o f the Tatars and could not afford to continue her armed occupation o f the Amur. The
Amur basin dispute, not even considered an issue during Spafarii’s mission, had become
Russia’s central concern in Far Eastern Politics. There were other differences cs well.
Golovin was not exposed to the rigid protocol and customs o f the Chinese capital.
Instead, he met Chinese negotiators at Nerchinsk and avoided the difficulties o f an official
presentation to the Emperor.311 In addition, the Chinese negotiators were not Chinese.
They were Jesuit priests chosen especially by the Chinese officials to ensure that the
cultural misunderstandings and difficulties experienced by Spafarii were avoided.3 12
Many historians would argue that the rigid instructions, or the Russian’s failure to
address the Amur basin issue, played a vital role in Spafarii’s failure. But despite
Spafarii’s rigid interpretation o f the instructions and his failure to address the Amur basin
issue, Spafarii seemed to be well accepted in China during the early portion o f his mission.
In spite o f his insistence on maintaining Russian protocol, Spafarii did manage to receive
an audience with the Emperor and establish a dialogue with high ranking officials. He
received translated copies o f the four official documents received during the last half
century from China and established Latin as the official language for future
communication. Spafarii even collected an impressive array o f Chinese goods and
gathered a great deal of information about the country for use in future contacts.312
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Conceivably, Spafarii could have accomplished a trade agreement despite the absence of
the Amur basin discussion and his adherence to his instructions.3 ^
True, Spafarii’s instructions in their original form were limiting, strict and
dogmatic. They presented little leeway and flexibility for negotiations, and could easily
become an enormous barrier to a successful mission. But these instructions also contained
room for interpretation. By taking certain liberties with the wording and paying dose
attention to Russia’s intention, Spafarii’s straight-laced instructions become extremely
workable. Although little could be done regarding the lack o f direction on the Amur basin
topic, the customary demands and rituals of Russian protocol and customs could be neatly
sidestepped. By libera.ly applying the clause regarding mission failure, Spafarii could
have interpreted the increasing hostility over, for example, the decision o f a meeting
location in Naun cr the argument over the early review o f the Tsar’s letter as threatening
the mission’s success and ignored the stringent requirements written in his instructions.
Unfortunately Spafarii was not the type to take liberties with interpretation. While
the instructors were clearly written to maintain Russian custom and thus the Tsar’s
honor, the intention o f the document indicated that the successful conclusion o f the trade
agreement and establishing positive relations were the higher priority. Spafari’s refusal to
liberally interpret his instructions, and his determination to follow the exact letter o f the
document, eliminated his flexibility and destroyed his opportunity to carry on negotiation.
But Spafarii’s interpretation of the instructions were not the worst aspect o f his mission.31
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Even a steadfast, yet uncooperative individual could have successfully opened a dialogue
between the two empires, and although it may have not established a trade agreement, a
greater understanding of both countries’ customs could have eventually been established.
But Spafarii’s mission was destined to travel the path o f conflict. His insolent and superior
manner created conflict beyond the disagreements caused by culture, and
misinterpretation.
Spafarii’s primary difficulty resulted when he became intractable, flaunting Chinese
customs and refusing to listen to the arguments presented by Chinese officials. His
behavior at the formal audience, for example, when he refused to kowtow properly or
slow his substituted bow to a stately and dignified pace, not only demonstrated his insolent
behavior, but insulted and disgraced the Chinese officials responsible for his actions.314
His continuous refusals to accept reasonable compromises like the arrangement o f the
meeting place in Naun, or alternative measures to ascertain the contents o f his official
documents infuriated and frustrated the Chinese. Similarly, his lies denying knowledge of
his mens’ actions in Peking, and information regarding the contents o f the 1670
Milovanov letter, created animosity and distrust. By mid-August, it had become clear to
the Chinese officials that Spafarii was unwilling to compromise and his demeanor ensured
that every issue would result in an argument. Even the most inn :ent requests had to be
accomplished by veiled threats. For example, when the Emperor desired that Spafarii be*
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painted by a talented painter, Spafarii replied that he was too tired and was unable to
accede to the Emperor’s request.
Although the immediate results of Spafarii’s failure was the loss o f trading right
and economic gain, Spafarii’s mission had a much greater impact on the continuing
Russo-Chinese relationship. Spafarii’s mission had made a lasting impression with the
Chinese. As Russia’s first official ambassador, he had portrayed himself as an arrogant,
demanding individual. His contempt for the Chinese and their culture was evident in every
ritual he refused to perform. Those he did perform were completed in such a rude and
^suiting manner that the Chinese were shocked and horrified at his audacity. The visions
o f Spafarii performing the stately kowtow in three quick half bows would remain in the
minds o f the Chinese officials for decades.
Spafarii’s negative impression was so great that nearly thirty years later, in 1712,
the Emperor recalled Spafarii immediately when his ambassador was expected to
rendezvous with a Russian envoy. He informed his representatives that "You will
p„rticularly mention to the messenger of the Emperor (i.e. o f Peter the Great, whose
envoy was expected to meet the Chinese embassy to the Ayaka Emperor o f Turguts) that
formerly when Mi-ko-lai of his kingdom came to China, his conduct was very perverse
and reprehensible, but that you are far from intending to follow his example.”315
Obviously, Spafarii’s actions remained an influencing factor on Chinese politics for several
years. Although it is unlikely that Spafarii’s mission alone could be held responsible for
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more than three hundred years of Chinese animosity and distrust, it is clear that his
mission set the precedent for modern political attitudes.
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